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I. INTRODUCTION
It's a clear sign the world has changed when thieves steal beer kegs not for
the beer but for the stainless steel, and duffers hit the links not to play golf but
to steal the aluminum cups from the golf course.' Commodities have come of
age. The media now follows oil and gold prices with all the breathless enthusi-
asm formerly reserved for high tech stocks.2 The debate over "peak oil" has
* Andrew M. Pardieck, Visiting Scholar & Lecturer, University of Washington School of
Law. This article was written, in part, while a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington. I would like to thank the faculty at Indiana for the
opportunity to present this paper, and for their constructive comments. My thanks also to
Professor Jerry Markham for reviewing the article, and for his helpful comments. Any errors
or omissions are, of course, solely mine.
I The increasing price of scrap metal resulted in over 250,000 beer kegs "wobbling" out of
circulation in the U.K. in 2005, joined by all 800 of the aluminum railway carts at Belgium's
main railway station, 25,000 manhole covers in Beijing, aluminum cups from the Royal
Johor Country Club in Malaysia, miles of idle rail track in Germany and crossbeams from
bridges in the U.S. Joel Millman, Metal Is So Precious that Scrap Thieves Now Tap Beer
Kegs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at Al. Copper prices have also made copper wiring in air
conditioning units and copper pipes in plumbing tempting targets. Sarah Schaefer Munoz &
Paul Glader, Copper & Robbers: Homeowners' Latest Worry; Thieves Target Wires, Pipes,
Air Conditioners as Price of Hot Commodity Soars, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at D1.
2 See, e.g., Barbara Hagenbaugh, Gold Prices Celebrate Uncertainty, Raising Oil Prices,
USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 2006, at 3B; Madlen Read, Silver and Gold Prices Each Hit 20-Year
Highs, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 19, 2006, at C4; Christopher Wang, Stock Market No Match
for Rising Oil, Gold Prices, PIrrSBURGH POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A9.
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entered the mainstream,3 and the debate over the impact of China and India's
increasing consumption of oil, steel, copper, and other commodities continues. 4
Commodities are no longer passing assumptions.
Neither are the commodities futures markets. They have grown enor-
mously. From 1999 to 2004, the number of contracts traded more than
doubled, increasing from approximately 500 million to 1.225 billion.5 During
the same period, the number of options contracts traded more than doubled,
increasing from approximately 123.5 million to 271 million.6 Futures invest-
ments are increasingly marketed to small, as well as institutional, investors.7
Investment advisers now advocate allocating a portion of individual investor
portfolios to commodities.8
The means for investing in commodities futures have increased. Mutual
funds have joined "the commodities boom" by offering funds which purchase
derivatives tracking commodities.9 Exchange traded funds ("ETFs") and
exchange traded notes ("ETNs") now track various commodities indices."l
Individual investors also have greater options for participating directly in the
futures markets. Individual investors can now purchase "mini-gold futures"'I
and futures contracts based on home prices in ten cities.' 2 Day traders have
turned to the futures markets and joined "thousands of other individual inves-
tors betting on the global currency markets."' 3 Individual investors form the
I Lauren Etter, Is the World Running Out of Oil?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8-9, 2005, at A5; David
J. Lynch, Debate Brews: Has Oil Production Peaked?, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2005, at Al;
Adam Porter, 'Peak Oil' Enters Mainstream Debate, BBC NEWS, June 10, 2005, http://
news.bbc.uk/2/hi/business/4077802.stm.
4 Daniel Akst, Something in the Air: Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, at 36; Susan
Antilla, Copper Linings for Wall St. Clouds?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct., 2, 1994, at 3-11; Eleanor
Laise & Peter A. McKay, Going For the Gold - As Commodities Prices Soar, Investment
Tools Emerge; The 'Mini' Futures Contract, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2006, at B1; Simon
Romero, Big Tires in Short Supply: A Struggle to Keep Equipment Going, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2006, at C I.
I CFTC, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 95, available at http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftcarchive.htm
(follow "2004 Annual Report" hyperlink) (noting most of the growth has come from
increased trading in financial products).
6 Id. at 104.
I Laise & McKay, supra note 4.
8 Id.
9 Tom Lauricella & Diya Gullapalli, For Mutual Funds, Commodities Boom Proves Sur-
prisingly Hard to Exploit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2006, at Cl.
10 Laise & McKay, supra note 4; John Spence, ETF Boom Expands with Exchange-Traded
Notes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5-6, 2006, at B4.
' I Id.
12 James R. Hagerty, New Tools to Hedge Your Home: Exotic Investment Products Target
Anxious Owners Eager to Lock in Their Gains, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17-18, 2005 at BI (Mer-
rill Lynch has also started marketing futures investments tied to housing-related stocks.); see
also Conrad De Aenlle, Seeking Cover If the Prices of Homes Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2006, at C6. Investors can also now "practice" trading futures in "virtual trading" accounts.
Eleanor Laise, The Reality of Fantasy Investing: Accounts Let Investors Practice Trading,
But Results Can Mislead, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2006, at DI.
13 Craig Karmin & Michael R. Sesit, Currency Markets Draw Speculation, Fraud: Day
Traders Find New Outlet in Foreign-Exchange Wagers; 'A Lot of George Soros Wannabes',
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at C .
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fastest growing segment of the $2 trillion-a-day foreign exchange market,
investing in accounts as small as $250 with leverage ratios of up to 400-to-i.14
With this increased focus on and participation in the commodities futures
markets has come increased fraud. Boiler room operations are not limited to
securities markets and have caused millions of dollars of losses in the commod-
ities options markets 15 and foreign currency markets.' 6 Since late 2000, the
Commodities Futures Exchange Commission ("CFTC") has pursued fraud
cases involving the currency markets and over 23,000 investors who have lost
approximately $350 million.' 7 From 1999 through 2004, the total number of
CFTC actions seeking injunctions grew from 20 to 44 and defendants named in
those actions from 61 to 177.8 In administrative cases, the CFTC assessed
approximately $27 million dollars in civil monetary penalties in 1999 compared
with $133 million in 2004.'9 In civil cases, the numbers rose from approxi-
mately $60 million in 1999 to $170 million in 2004.20
While the growing futures markets and fraud have received growing atten-
tion, commodities law, by and large, has not. Congress has debated expanding
the authority of the CFTC to "clamp down on fraud in the natural-gas mar-
'4 Karen Richardson & Peter A. McKay, A Risky Money Game: Currency Trading Spreads
to the Little Guy; How 'Leverage' Leaves Investors Teetering, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28-29, at
B 1; John Partridge, Investors Roll the Dice on Foreign Exchange; Rapid Retail Customer
Increase in Market, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 6, 2005, at B 18 (explaining that in January 2002,
the National Futures Association ("NFA") had seven active foreign exchange dealer-mem-
bers holding $42 million in funds for clients. By September, 2005, there were thirty-one
foreign exchange dealer-members holding approximately $795 million in funds for clients).
15 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION AND OTHER
CLAIMS § 10.4 (2005). Boiler room operations have been defined as
a temporary operation established to sell a specific speculative security. Solicitation is by tele-
phone to new customers, the salesman conveying favorable earnings projections, predictions of
price rises and other optimistic prospects without a factual basis. The perspective buyer is not
informed of known or readily ascertainable adverse information; he is not cautioned about the
risks inherent in purchasing a speculative security; and he is left with a deliberately created
expectation of gain without risk.
Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 n.14 (2d Cir. 1969).
i6 SEE CFTC, Consumer Advisory: Foreign Currency (FOREX) Fraud, http://www.cftc.
gov/files/enf/enfforexbrochure.pdf (last visited May 28, 2007); CFI'C, Enforcement Com-
plaints: Federal Court Freezes Assets of Five Florida Foreign Currency (FOREX) Boiler
Rooms and Five Individuals Charged with Defrauding Customers of Over $17 Million, June
29, 2005, http://www.cftc.gov/enf/enfcomplaints.htm; CFTC, Enforcement Complaints:
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Other Federal Authorities Cooperate to
Shut Down New York Foreign Currency (FOREX) Boiler Room Operation; CFTC Charges
Richmond Global Entities of Staten Island, New York and Four Individuals with Defrauding
160 Customers of Millions of Dollars in Forex Scheme, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.cftc.gov/
enf/enfcomplaints.htm.
17 Peter A. McKay, Scammers Operating on Periphery of CFTC's Domain Lure Little Guy
with Fantastic Promises of Profits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at Cl; CFTC, Consumer
Advisory, Foreign Currency (FOREX) Fraud, http://www.cftc.gov/files/enf/enfforexbro-
chure.pdf (last visited May 28, 2007).
is 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
19 Compare CFTC, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.cftc.gov/anr/anrenf99.
htm; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 5, at 41.
20 Id.
Spring 2007]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
kets,"' but the focus has been on institutional investors in the natural-gas
derivatives markets, and there has been little debate about the anti-fraud provi-
sions within or promulgated pursuant to the Commodities Exchange Act
(CEA).
The same is true of the suitability doctrine and its role in U.S. commodi-
ties law. While the scope of the suitability requirements under U.S. securities
law remains a perennial source of debate within academia and the securities
industry, that debate has been all but silent as it relates to the futures market. In
1986 the CFTC and federal courts rejected arguments that the recommendation
of unsuitable futures transactions transactions violated the anti-fraud provisions
of the CEA.2 2 Since then, an unspoken, growing divide has arisen separating
the black letter law that there is no suitability requirement under federal com-
modities law and the reality that futures transactions continue to be recom-
mended to unsuitable investors. The CFTC, its administrative law judges, and
the National Futures Association ("NFA") continue to confront suitability
issues.2 3
The increased focus on commodities futures markets, increased participa-
tion in those markets, and increased levels of fraud all suggest the time is ripe
to reexamine the suitability doctrine and its role in U.S. commodities law. Part
II of this Article provides background. The suitability doctrine has its roots in
U.S. securities law and is debated in the context of securities transactions. This
section examines the suitability doctrine under U.S. securities law and provides
a point of comparison. Part III of this Article examines the suitability doctrine
under U.S. commodities law: its proposal, rejection, and resurrection in dis-
guised form. Examination of the rules and regulatory decisions of the CFTC
and NFA shows that suitability issues are now addressed indirectly and inade-
quately. Part IV discusses the possibility of a more suitable rule. Scholars
have suggested the imposition of objective suitability standards. 24 This Article
urges consideration of the imposition of a uniform suitability standard for indi-
vidual or retail investors in futures markets similar to that covering the securi-
ties futures products now jointly regulated by the CFTC and the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC").2 5 Finally, Part V offers some closing
thoughts about the discrepancy between securities and commodities law and the
disparity between commodities law and practice.
21 Michael Schroeder & Peter A. McKay, House Clears CFTC Expansion, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 15, 2005, at C5.
22 See infra Part III.B citing, inter alia, Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. 80-
385-80-704, 1986 WL 68447 (Sept. 5, 1986); Nobrega v. Futures Trading Group, Inc., No.
98-R161, 1999 WL 450858, at *9 (July 1, 1999) ("The Commodities Exchange Act's
antifraud provisions have been definitively interpreted by the Commission as not including a
general duty to inquire into a customer's suitability to trade futures.").
23 See infra Part III.B-C.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 This paper does not address suitability issues involving institutional investors, a topic
covered elsewhere. See Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor - Jungle
Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995).
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II. THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE & SECURITIES LAW
A. What is the Suitability Doctrine?
A definition of suitability provides a logical starting point in thinking
about the suitability doctrine under U.S. commodities law. Defining suitability,
however, requires reference to securities law, and reference to securities law
suggests the answer depends on where one looks. Scholars have provided a
fairly uniform definition. Professor Poser has defined the suitability doctrine as
a requirement that "a broker-dealer who makes recommendations to a customer
recommend only those securities that he reasonably believes are suitable for the
customer."26 Professors Loss and Seligman have similarly defined suitability
as "an obligation on the part of the dealer to recommend only securities that are
suitable to the needs of a particular customer."27
The variation comes when one looks at suitability rules. Suitability rules
established by self regulatory organizations ("SROs") have been around for
decades. The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") adopted its
first suitability rule as part of its ethical guidelines in 1939.28 Suitability rules
began receiving widespread attention and increased application in the 1960s in
response to boiler room operations,2 9 and in the intervening forty years they
have assumed a variety of forms. NASD Rule 2310 currently states:
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suit-
able for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer
as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
30
26 NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 3.03 (2001).
27 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9-C-3
(2004); see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transac-
tions, 54 Bus. LAW. 1557 (1999) ("The suitability doctrine... may be broadly defined as a
duty on the part of the broker to recommend to a customer only those securities which are
suitable to the investment objectives and peculiar needs of a particular customer.").
28 The NASD's suitability rule was adopted in response to the Maloney Act of 1938, which
authorized the SEC to register national securities associations subject to the condition that
they adopt rules designed "to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices [and] to
promote just and equitable principles of trade." Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv.
1255, 1321 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at § 9-C-3.
30 NASD, Rule 2310, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid
=1189&recordid=1159000499 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). See also NASD, IM-2310(1),
Possible Application of SEC Rules 15g-I through 15g-9, available at http://
nasd.complinet.com/ (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2300. Transactions with
Customers" hyperlink; then follow "IM-2310-1." hyperlink)(last visited Mar. .3, 2007);
NASD, IM 2310-2, Fair Dealing with Customers, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/
(follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2300. Transactions with Customers" hyperlink;
then follow "IM-2310-2. Fair Dealing with Customers" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3,
2007); NASD, IM 2310-3, Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, available at
http://nasd.complinet.com (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2300. Transactions
with Customers" hyperlink; then follow "IM-2310-3." hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
These Interpretive Materials are accorded the same weight as the rule itself. Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1559.
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Brokers are to have "reasonable grounds" for believing their "recommen-
dation is suitable," and in establishing such reasonable grounds, brokers are to
make reasonable efforts to obtain information including (1) the customer's
financial status, (2) the customer's tax status, (3) the customer's investment
objectives, and (4) such other information used or considered to be to be rea-
sonable in making recommendations to the customer.3 1 The Municipal Securi-
ties Rulemaking Board ("MSRB") has adopted a similar rule,32 while the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") states that every member must:
(1) [u]se due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every
order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and
every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such
organization.
33
The "eleventh commandment of Wall Street' 34 was designed to protect
NYSE members from dishonest or insolvent customers and imposes no express
suitability requirement, but it has become much more.35 It is now interpreted
as to "protecting investors from being induced to purchase securities whose
risks they can ill afford,"3 6 and NYSE examiners have informally defined the
"essential facts" relative to every customer as "any information which affects
the customer's ability to accept risk."'37 The NYSE rule by definition applies to
"every customer" and "every order" and, as a result, is not limited to
"recommendations. ' 38
Perhaps more significant for the purposes of examining commodities
futures regulation, the NASD, NYSE, Chicago Board of Options Exchange,
and other securities markets have all adopted expanded suitability rules for
transactions involving greater risk.39 For options, index and currency warrants,
31 NASD, Rule 2310, supra note 30.
32 MSRB, Rule G-19, Suitability of Recommendations and Transactions; Discretionary
Accounts, available at http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/rules/rulegl9.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
33 NYSE, Operation of Member Organizations Rule 405, available at http://rules.nyse.com/
NYSE/NYSERules/ (follow "Operation of Member Organizations (Rules 325-465)" hyper-
link) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
34 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at § 9-C-3.
31 POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[A][2]; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1571,
1596 n.200; MARKHAM, supra note 15, at § 10.1.
36 POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[A][2].
37 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1571.
38 Id.
39 NASD, Rule 2860(19) Options, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/ (follow "2000-
3000" hyperlink; then follow "2800. Special Products" hyperlink; then follow "2860.
Options" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). See also NASD, Rule 2840 Trading in
Index Warrants, Currency Index Warrants, and Currency Warrants, available at http://nasd.
complinet.com/ (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2800. Special Products" hyper-
link; then follow "2840" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); NASD, Rule 2844 Suitabil-
ity, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/ (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow
"2800. Special Products" hyperlink; then follow "2844. Suitability" hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 3, 2007); NASD, Rule 2865(19) Securities Futures, available at http://
nasd.complinet.com/ (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2800. Special Products"
hyperlink; then follow "2865 Securities Futures" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange, Rule 9.9 Suitability of Recommendations, http:/lwallstreet.
cch.com/CBOE/Rules/ (follow "Chapters I-XXVII" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007);
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and securities futures products regulated by the SEC, the NASD prohibits any
member from recommending a contract, unless there are "reasonable grounds"
to believe, after reasonable inquiry, that the recommended transaction is "not
unsuitable" for such customer.4° Moreover, according to NASD Rule
2860(19),
[n]o member or person associated with a member shall recommend to a customer an
opening transaction in any option contract unless the person making the recommen-
dation has a reasonable basis for believing, at the time of making a recommendation,
that the customer has such knowledge and experience in financial matters that he
may reasonably be expected to be capable of evaluating the risks of the recom-
mended transaction, and is financially able to bear the risks of the recommended
position in the option contract.
4 1
While NASD Rule 2310 provides a general suitability rule requiring "rea-
sonable efforts" to obtain a "reasonable basis" for believing a recommendation
is suitable for the customer, NASD Rule 2860(19), the suitability rule for
options transactions, requires reasonable grounds to believe the transaction is
"not unsuitable" and a reasonable basis for believing the customer can under-
stand and bear the risks. The NYSE offers similar rules for option and warrant
transactions4 2 and poses additional information-gathering obligations., requir-
ing members to obtain from options customers: customer's investment objec-
tives, employment status, estimated annual income, estimated net worth,
estimated liquid net worth, marital status, age, and investment experience.4 3
American Stock Exchange, Rule 923 Suitability, available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/
AMEX/Rules/ (follow "Trading of Options Contracts" hyperlink) (last visited Mar 3, 2007);
NYSE, Rule 723 Suitability, available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERules/ (follow
"Option Rules" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). The NYSE rule provides, for exam-
ple, that
[n]o member organization or member, allied member or employee of such member organization
shall recommend to a customer an opening transaction in any option contract unless the person
making the recommendation has a reasonable basis for believing, at the time of making the
recommendation, that the customer has such knowledge and experience in financial matters that
he may reasonably be expected to be capable of evaluating the risks of the recommended trans-
action, and is financially able to bear the risks of the recommended position in the option
contract.
Id.
40 A securities futures product is a legally binding contract between two parties to purchase
or sell in the future a specific quantity of shares of the security or of the component securi-
ties of the narrow-based security index, at a certain price. NFA, NFA Rule 2-30(b): Cus-
tomer Information and Risk Disclosure, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/
manualCompliance.asp (last visited May 24, 2006).
4' NASD, Rule 2860(19), supra note 39.
42 NYSE Rule 723, supra note 39; NYSE, Rule 414 Index and Currency Warrants, availa-
ble at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERules/ (follow "Operation of Member Organiza-
tions" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
" Members are required to obtain from options customers information regarding the cus-
tomer's investment objectives, employment status, estimated annual income, estimated net
worth, estimated liquid net worth, marital status, age, and investment experience. NYSE
Rule 721 Opening of Accounts, available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERules/ (fol-
low "Option Rules" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). Sanctions are imposed under
NYSE Rule 476(a), its due diligence rule. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1572-
73. See also Chicago Board of Options Exchange Rule 9.7 Opening of Accounts, Rule 9.9
Suitability of Recommendation available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/CBOE/Rules/ (follow
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The SEC, in turn, has promulgated its own suitability rules. In 1962, the
SEC adopted Rule 15c-2 requiring broker-dealers to determine the suitability of
sales of equity funding programs.' In 1967, the SEC adopted Rule 15b10-3,
now abolished, requiring suitability determinations by broker-dealers who were
not members of the NASD.45 In 1989, the SEC adopted what is now desig-
nated as Rule 15g-9 to address fraud in "penny stocks" markets.46 The rule
prohibits broker-dealers from selling penny stocks unless they have first
approved the purchaser's account for transactions in penny stocks, obtain suffi-
cient information from the purchaser to make an appropriate suitability deter-
mination, provide the purchaser with a written statement setting forth the basis
of that determination, obtain a signed copy of the suitability statement from the
purchaser, and receive a written agreement to the transaction from the pur-
chaser.47 It is unlawful for a broker or dealer to approve an account for trans-
actions in penny stocks unless the broker or dealer "reasonably determines,"
based on information known or obtained concerning the person's financial situ-
ation, investment experience, and investment objectives, and any other infor-
mation known by the broker-dealer, "that transactions in penny stocks are
suitable for the person, and that the person . . . has sufficient knowledge and
experience in financial matters that the person ... reasonably may be expected
to be capable of evaluating the risks of transactions in designated penny
"Chapters I-XXVII" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007); Rule 30.52 Special Requirements
for Stock Index Warrants, Currency Index Warrants and Currency Warrants available at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/CBOE/Rules/ (follow "Chapter XXX" hyperlink) (last visited Mar.
3, 2007). CBOE Rule 9.9 provides: every member who recommends to a customer any
option contract "shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is not
unsuitable for such customer" and no member shall recommend an opening transaction in
any option contract unless the person making the recommendation "has a reasonable basis
for believing at the time of making the recommendation that the customer has such knowl-
edge and experience in financial matters that he may reasonably be expected to be capable of
evaluating the risks of the recommended transaction, and is financially able to bear the risks
of the recommended position in the option contract."
" SEC Rule 15c2-5, Disclosure and Other Requirements When Extending or Arranging
Credit in Certain Transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (2006) (It shall constitute a "fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice" for any broker or dealer to offer or sell any
security in connection with an offer to extend any credit unless such broker or dealer before
any transaction is entered into "[o]btains from such person information concerning his finan-
cial situation and needs, reasonably determines that the entire transaction, including the loan
arrangement, is suitable for such person, and retains in his files a written statement setting
forth the basis upon which the broker or dealer made such determination."); Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1583.
41 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1583-84.
46 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at § 9-C-3[a]. Congress followed with the Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 finding that "unscrupulous market practices and market partici-
pants have pervaded the 'penny stock' market with an overwhelming amount of fraud and
abuse." Pub. L. No. 101-429 § 502(4), 104 Stat. 931, 951 (1990).
41 SEC, Rule 15g-9 Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15g-9; Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429 §§ 501-510, 104 Stat. 931, 951-958 (1990); SEC, Sales Practice
Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 27, 160, [1989-
1990 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,440 at 80,416 (Aug. 22, 1989) available
at 1989 WL 1093447.
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stocks."4 8 Finally, in 1994, the SEC proposed suitability rules under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940.49
Setting aside the various rules and formulations, whether one looks to the
SRO rules or the SEC rules, it is clear that the suitability doctrine plays an
important role, especially when the securities transactions are deemed to pre-
sent a higher risk. Whether it is options, warrants, securities futures, or penny
stocks, brokers-dealers are required to have reasonable grounds for believing
the recommended transactions are suitable or "not unsuitable" for the customer,
based on a reasonable inquiry into the customer's investment objectives, finan-
cial situation, and needs, and a determination that the customer has the knowl-
edge and experience to evaluate the risks and the financial means to bear the
risk.
B. Suitability, the SEC, and the Federal Courts
Courts have, of course, rejected the violation of SRO rules as independent
grounds for a private cause of action against the broker,5" but the rules continue
to inform judicial determinations of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in
civil suits.5 Courts have also rejected a private right of action for violation of
the SEC penny stock rules set out above,5" but both the SRO and SEC suitabil-
ity rules impact SRO and SEC regulatory action.
The SEC analyzes suitability issues under the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities law and the SEC rules promulgated pursuant thereto.5 3 The
SEC held early on that a violation of the suitability doctrine could violate SEC
Rule lOb-5 based on the shingle theory, a theory "whereby it is presumed that a
broker-dealer that hangs out a shingle and solicits customers makes an implied
representation of fair dealing."5 4  In 1969, the Second Circuit explicitly
endorsed this: "A securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of
securities and that by his position implicitly represents he has an adequate basis
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9 (2006).
49 These rules have not been adopted. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1584.
50 See, e.g., Spicer v. Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.
1992); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1419 (11th Cir.
1983). See also POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[A][1].
51 POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[A][1] and 3.03[C]; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27,
at 1585.
52 Uhre v. Emmett A. Larkin Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481 (D. Md. 2002) ("In simple
terms, § 15(g) sets forth the requirements for transactions in penny stocks. It does not create
a private right of action in favor of anyone.").
13 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1580-81.
54 Id.; Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1271,
1271 (1995). See also In re Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 1962 SEC LEXIS 514, at
*11 (Feb. 8, 1962) ("A broker-dealer in his dealings with customers impliedly represents that
his opinions and predictions respecting a stock which he had undertaken to recommend are
responsibly made on the basis of actual knowledge and careful consideration."); MARKHAM,
supra note 15, § 10.1 ("The shingle theory is simply a belief that because a broker in effect
hangs out his shingle as a professional, the broker should not make investment recommenda-
tions to customers that are unsuitable for the individual to whom the advice is being given.");
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27.
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for the opinions he renders .... He cannot recommend a security unless there
is an adequate and reasonable basis for such recommendation."55
While subsequent Supreme Court decisions narrowly interpreting civil lia-
bility under the Exchange Act have called into question the continued viability
of the shingle theory,5 6 nothing has called into question the continued viability
of the suitability doctrine. In 1999, the SEC examined the conduct of regis-
tered representatives at Olde Discount Corp. and stated unequivocally:
Making unsuitable recommendations to customers without disclosing the unsuitabil-
ity of those solicited investments, in breach of an affirmative duty to disclose arising
from a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence, violate[s] Sections 10
(b) and 15 (c)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rules l0b-5 and 15cl-2.57
The court found Olde's recommendation of "special venture stocks" to
investors with conservative investment needs and objectives not suitable, and
the Olde representatives "did not disclose this unsuitability to any of the cus-
tomers in question."' 5 8 The Olde representatives exercised de facto control over
some of the accounts and, as a result, had "an affirmative duty to disclose the
unsuitable nature of the recommendations made to the customers. 5 9
A breach of the suitability doctrine and liability under the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities law are not, however, dependent upon a breach of
fiduciary duties or a finding of a relationship of trust and confidence. "A sales-
person's recommendations must be suitable for the client in light of the client's
investment objectives, as determined by the client's financial situation and
needs,"'60 and unsuitable recommendations violate the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws where:
(i) the recommended securities were, or the level of trading activity was, unsuited to
the customer's need; (ii) the salesperson knew that his recommendations were unsuit-
able or acted with recklessness regarding their suitability and making them; and (iii)
the salesperson made material representations or fail to disclose material information
relating to the suitability of the securities or the level of trading, including the associ-
ated risks.
6 1
In In re Alacan, there was no suggestion of de facto control or a relation-
ship of trust and confidence; to the contrary, the investors followed their invest-
ments and complained about unauthorized trades. 62 The SEC found fraud
because the registered representative repeatedly recommended "in and out trad-
ing" in highly speculative securities without disclosing the risks and in reckless
11 Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (1969) ("By his recommendation he implies that a
reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on the conclu-
sions based on such investigation."). Id. at 597.
56 Karmel, supra note 54, at 1282-94.
11 In re Olde Disc. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 40,423, Securities Act Release No.
7577, 67 S.E.C. Docket 2045, 1998 WL 575171, at *20 (Sept. 10, 1998).
58 Id. at *21.
19 Id. ("Olde acted with scienter, in the form of a reckless disregard for the suitability of
investment recommendations made by its [registered representatives] to the firm's custom-
ers, by focusing the firm's training primarily [all] on aggressive sales techniques.").
60 In re Alacan, Exchange Act Release No. 49,970, Securities Act Release No. 8436, 83
S.E.C. Docket 723, 2004 WL 1496843, at *9 (July 6, 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
61 Id. at *9.
62 Id. at *1-7.
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disregard of the investment objectives of his customers." 3 "Alacan took advan-
tage of the fact that these customers were elderly and vulnerable in causing
them to make risky investments and trade their accounts at frequencies that
were unsuited to their needs."6 4
Where the investors are older, with modest financial profiles, unsophisti-
cated, with conservative investment strategies, or pointedly inform the broker
that the investment was to be used for medical expenses, the SEC will find the
recommendation of speculative securities on margin unsuitable and a violation
of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.65 The violation
occurs because the broker "misrepresented material facts to persuade his cus-
tomers that there was no risk to purchasing on margin or, claiming that the
price of the stock would rise substantially or that their accounts would not be
subject to margin calls," and, in doing so, the broker "failed to fulfill his
responsibility to ensure that his customers, on a current basis, fully understood
the risks involved and were both able and willing to take those risks."66 In
these cases, the SEC finds unsuitable recommendations fraudulent by pointing
to misrepresentations regarding risk, or omissions or "failures," to ensure the
investor understood and could bear the risk.
In each of these cases, the investors' decision regarding the suitability of
the transaction is not dispositive. "Whether or not customers considered [the]
purchase of the stock ... a suitable investment is not the test for determining
the propriety of applicants' conduct.",67 According to the SEC, the test is
whether the broker "fulfilled the obligation he assumed when he undertook to
counsel the customers, of making only such recommendations as would be con-
sistent with the customer's financial situation and needs."6 8
63 Id. at *9.
6 Id.; see also SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Securities
dealers cannot recommend securities without a reasonable basis for the recommendation; if
essential information is not known to a securities dealer, the dealer must inform investors
that this information is unknown and must disclose the risks of such uncertainty.").
65 In re Muth, S.E.C. Release No. 52,551, Exchange Act Release No. 8622, 2005 WL
2428336, at *12 (Oct. 3, 2005).
66 Id.
67 In re Philips & Co., S.E.C. Release No. 5294, 37 S.E.C. 66, 1956 WL 54332, at *3 (Apr.
9, 1956). The SEC went on to find that "[t]he record shows that Bernheimer knew all the
facts necessary to enable him to realize that reasonable grounds for his recommendations did
not exist." Id.
68 Id.; In re Chase, S.E.C. Release No. 47,476, 79 S.E.C. Docket 225, 2003 WL 917974, at
*4 (Mar. 10, 2003) ("The test for whether Chase's recommendations were suitable is not
whether Horvath acquiesced in them, but whether his recommendations were consistent with
her financial situation and needs."); In re Faber, S.E.C. Release No. 49,216, 82 S.E.C.
Docket 453, 2004 WL 239507, at *6 (Feb. 10, 2004) ("A recommendation is not suitable
merely because the customer acquiesces in the recommendation. Rather, the recommenda-
tion must be consistent with the customer's financial situation and needs."); In re Stein,
S.E.C. Release No. 47,335, 79 S.E.C. Docket 1777, 2003 WL 431870, at *2 (Feb. 10, 2003)
A registered representative does not satisfy the suitability requirement simply by disclosing the
risk of an investment that he or she has recommended. Even in cases in which a customer
affirmatively seeks to engage in highly speculative or otherwise aggressive trading, a representa-
tive is under a duty to refrain from making recommendations that are incompatible with the
customer's financial profile.
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In short, the SEC has sought to impose, both through its rule-making
authority and in enforcement actions, a suitability requirement on securities
professionals working with the retail investor. The latter has resulted in find-
ings of unsuitability and fraud where the broker knew his recommendations
were unsuitable and failed to disclose their unsuitability, failed to disclose the
risk, and failed to ensure that the investors fully understood those risks.
The federal courts have been less expansive in their treatment of the suita-
bility doctrine but nonetheless recognized a suitability requirement under fed-
eral law and civil liability for its breach. When confronted with suitability
claims, the courts analyze them as a subset of fraud under the federal securities
laws.
The first to do so was Clark v. Lamula Investors, Inc. in 1978.69 In Clark,
a retired teacher sought to invest conservatively and her broker recommended
convertible debentures, resulting in sizable losses. 70 There was no evidence the
defendant misrepresented anything. The plaintiff simply argued that the defen-
dant knowingly recommended unsuitable securities.7 1 The jury found the
debentures were unsuitable, the broker knew it, and he failed to inform the
plaintiff about their ratings and the extent of risk.72 The Second Circuit found
a violation of SEC Rule 1Ob-5: "Lamula engaged in an act, practice or course
of business which operated as a fraud or deceit ... and omitted to state facts
material to an informed purchase by her."73 Clark v. Kidder Peabody & Co.,
Inc. followed, finding "[t]he knowing recommendation of an unsuitable secur-
ity states a cause of action for fraud under Section 10(b)."' 74 The second Clark
decision found the "unsuitable purchase itself is the proscribed act, not any
representation connected with that purchase."7 5 In other words, liability for an
unsuitable transaction requires neither a misrepresentation nor an omission.
The result is that it is now well accepted under federal securities law that
broker liability for an unsuitable securities transaction can arise from either a
recommendation of an unsuitable security and related misrepresentation or
omission, under the "misstatement-omission theory," or fraud by conduct in the
execution of the trade itself, under the "fraudulent conduct theory."7 6
Federal courts have analogized the latter to churning. In O'Connor v. R.F.
Lafferty & Co., the plaintiff sought to invest conservatively in a discretionary
account controlled by her broker, who successfully managed her account for a
number of years and then unsuccessfully invested in oil and gas limited partner-
ships, stocks, and warrants.77 The plaintiffs alleged the purchase of those
69 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978); POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03.
70 Id. at 597, 599.
71 Id. at 599.
72 Id. at 600.
73 Id.
7' 636 F. Supp. 195, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
75 Id.
76 POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[B]; Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 27, § 9-C-3; Lowenfels
& Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1585-89; Lyle Roberts, Suitability Claims Under Rule l0b-5:
Are Public Entities Sophisticated Enough to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 801, 810
(1996).
77 965 F.2d 893, 895-96 (10th Cir. 1992).
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investments acted as a fraud.7 8 The court looked to the elements of a churning
claim for guidance and found the plaintiff must prove: (1) the broker recom-
mended or in a discretionary account purchased securities that were unsuitable
in light of the investor's objectives; (2) the broker recommended or purchased
the securities with an intent to defraud or with reckless disregard for the inves-
tor's interests; and (3) the broker exercised control over the investor's
account.79 The court found that "the control element is essential" to establish
causation and reliance, but it concluded in O'Conner that scienter was disposi-
tive.8 ° There was no indication of an intentional or reckless attempt to defraud,
and, hence, no liability.81
Federal courts have analyzed suitability claims based on misrepresentation
or omissions as a subset of SEC Rule lOb-5 misrepresentation claims. In
Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., the court held that the plaintiffs, four hun-
dred unsophisticated investors in oil and gas limited partnerships, must prove:
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer's needs; (2) that the
defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities were unsuited to the buyer's
needs; (3) that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable securities for
the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made material misrepresenta-
tions (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material information) relating
to the suitability of the securities; and (5) the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment
on the defendant's fraudulent conduct.
82
The court assumed that E.F. Hutton made oral assurances that the invest-
ments were low or no risk,83 but it found that any reliance on these assurances
was not justified as a matter of law.84 "The disclosure of risks adequately
informed the Limited Partners that the investment was not suitable .... ,85
While the courts examine whether the investor reasonably relied on the
broker's recommendation and have rejected suitability claims where the inves-
tors did not read the disclosure documents, they continue to recognize that
unsuitable recommendations can be fraudulent and violate federal securities
law. As recently as 2005, the Southern District of New York in Louros v.
Kreiccias applied the elements set out in Brown to deny summary judgment to
an investment advisor who counseled a sophisticated investor, an attorney with
an MBA and a degree in economics, into losing over $500,000.86 The court
found evidence to infer that some of the defendant's options trading strategies
were unsuited to Mr. Louros' objectives, the defendant knew it, and genuine
78 Id. at 898.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 898, 900.
81 Id. at 900; see also Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519
N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 1994) (applying the O'Connor test to the Minnesota Securities Act and
finding the trading consistent with plaintiffs investment objectives and financial situation,
insufficient evidence showing defendant's fraudulent intent or control of plaintiff's account,
and upholding summary judgment against plaintiff on his suitability claim).
82 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993).
83 Id. at 1028.
84 Id. at 1031.
85 Id. at 1033.
86 367 F. Supp. 2d 572, 585, 593 (2005).
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issues of material fact remained as to the plaintiffs justifiable reliance.87
While the plaintiff signed account forms acknowledging the risks of options
trading, the court found the standard options disclosure booklet and risk warn-
ings said little about the specific risks, the "vertical bull spreads," that caused
the plaintiff's loses. 88 In other words, there was no explanation of the specific
risks of the position the defendant created, and as a result, the plaintiffs suita-
bility claims remained.8 9
Looking at both SEC enforcement actions and civil suits brought in fed-
eral courts shows that suitability requirements are firmly established, and that
an unsuitable recommendation can be fraudulent. The fraud arises where the
broker recklessly disregards the unsuitability of his recommendation and mis-
represents its suitability, fails to disclose the risk, fails to ensure the customer
understands the risks, or where the broker has de facto or legal control over the
account and recommends and or causes to be purchased the unsuitable
securities.
The principal distinction that arises is that the SEC focuses on the broker
in an enforcement action and whether the investor thought the transaction suita-
ble matters not. The courts in civil suits, in contrast, hold that what the investor
thought or did not think is often dispositive; if the investor's reliance on the
broker's recommendation was unreasonable, there is no relief from an unsuita-
ble recommendation.
C. Suitability Rules and SRO Arbitration
Discussion of civil suits involving suitability claims in the federal courts
based on federal securities law, however, offers an incomplete picture. Follow-
ing the Supreme Court's decisions in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon and Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration clauses have become the norm, and arbitration
almost an exclusive forum for resolving investor-broker related disputes.9"
Arbitration of suitability claims offers another standard, or standards. Arbitra-
tors can decide cases based on a violation of SRO rules, federal law, state law,
or equity. 91
87 Id. at 586.
88 Id. at 581, 591. A vertical spread is an
option strategy that involves purchasing an option at one strike price while simultaneously sell-
ing another option of the same class at the next higher or lower strike price. Both options have
the same expiration date .... The investor who buys a vertical spread hopes to profit as the
difference between the option premium on the two option position widens or narrows.
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 774 (6th ed. 2003).
89 State courts applying state security statutes have followed federal courts in recognizing a
claim for fraud based on an unsuitable recommendation. See, e.g., Boettcher & Co. v. Mun-
son, 854 P.2d 199, 208-09 (Colo. 1993); Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Wil-
liams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn. 1994).
90 Madelaine Eppenstein, International Investors' Rights and Remedies in the Adjudication
of Disputes with U.S. Securities and Commodities Firms in the Context of U.S. Arbitral
Forum Selection, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 443, 455 (2002).
91 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1593-94.
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Arbitrators may balance the equities without rigid adherence to the legal
formula set out above. The first page of the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration's Arbitrator's Handbook quotes Domke on Aristotle:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is equitable to prefer
arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the judge
looks only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators where appointed was that equity
might prevail.
92
While the arbitrator keeps "equity in view," it is difficult to keep the arbi-
trator in view. The NASD has proposed changes to its arbitration rules that
would allow investors to request written explanations in arbitration awards;
however, arbitrators have not traditionally been required to provide a "reasoned
award," and most do not.93 We are left with the exceptions, those arbitrators
who offer an analysis of the claims, and statistics. 94 Both offer insight here.
Examining those arbitration awards that provide a factual or legal basis for
the award shows that suitability issues are not treated uniformly. One need not
look far to find awards that turn on the presence of written risk disclosures, as
found in Brown v. E.F. Hutton.95 Arbitration panels have rejected SEC find-
ings of sales practice abuses including unsuitable trading in speculative stocks,
leaving the dissenting arbitrator to point out that the claimants, a retired factory
worker and small business owner, had minimal resources and no ability to
understand the risk disclosure or "special ventures authorization letter"
provided.96
92 SICA, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 1 (2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/
groups/med..arb/documents/mediation arbitration/nasdw_009668.pdf; see also Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1594.
93 NASD Rule 10330(e) currently requires awards to
contain the names of the parties and counsel; a summary of the issues; the damages and other
relief requested and awarded; a statement of any other issues resolved; the names of the arbitra-
tor[s]; the dates the claim was filed and the award rendered; the location, number, and dates of
hearing sessions; and the signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the award.
SEC, Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, to Provide
Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of Customers, or of Associ-
ated Persons in Industry Controversies. 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (July 15, 2005); NASD Code
of Arbitration Procedure, Rule 10330 Awards, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/
display/display.html?rbid= 1189&recordid= 1159001049&highlight=code+of+arbitration+
procedure (last visited May 23, 2006). The NASD's proposed rule would allow customers,
or associated persons in industry controversies, to request a written explanation in the arbi-
tration award. Under the proposed rule, an "explained decision" is one including "a fact-
based award that states the reason(s) each alleged cause of action was granted or denied and
will address all claims involved in the case ... [t]he inclusion of legal authorities or damage
calculations, however, will not be required." Id.
94 "An arbitrator may make an award without explanation, but some summary [and] analy-
sis of the parties' respective duties to each other and themselves . . . may assist in their
understanding and perception of the fairness of this arbitration system as a means of resolv-
ing disputes in the securities industry." In re Wyman v. Guidry, N.A.S.D. Docket No. 01-
05436, 2002 WL 32026658, at * 1 (Apr. 9, 2002).
95 991 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1993).
96 In re Swanagan v. Olde Disc. Corp., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 98-00087, 1999 WL 1427746,
at *3-5 (Aug. 23, 1999).
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Arbitration panels, following O'Connor,9 7  have stated flatly that
"[s]uitability is not a viable issue when the client controls the account," and that
"a broker owes no fiduciary duty to a client who is both a sophisticated and
independent investor."98 These decisions, however, are interspersed with arbi-
tration awards and reasoning that clearly break with the courts in their analysis
of suitability issues. They recognize liability for the breach of suitability duties
where courts simply would not.
One often-cited example of this is In re Peterzell v. Charles Schwab &
Co., where an arbitration panel imposed liability on a brokerage for its failure
to stop a wealthy and sophisticated investor from unsuitable trading.9 9 In In re
Peterzell, the arbitrators found that the claimant provided false information to
the broker and continued to trade as losses mounted, yet concluded:
Suitability... is an ongoing obligation and, although Charles Schwab initially met its
suitability obligations, it failed to maintain any ongoing supervision of the Claimant's
suitability. At some point in time, Claimant became unsuitable, even with his false
representations. 100
The panel found that Charles Schwab's compliance department should
have realized Peterzell's losses were disproportionate to his claimed net worth
and annual income, and it found them liable for a portion of Mr. Peterzell's
losses. 10
In re Peterzell does not stand alone. Arbitration panels have dispensed
with any requirement that a broker act recklessly or with scienter in recom-
mending an unsuitable securities transaction. In In re Crooks v. Hilliard Lyons,
the arbitrator found the claimant to be an unsophisticated investor who relied
on her broker and found the broker to be a "well-meaning, honest, hard-work-
ing customer interested registered representative." The registered representa-
tive had purchased the stock in question for her own and her husband's account
as well as recommended it to others.'0 2 The arbitrator found claimant's losses
resulting from the purchase were:
[a] result of the omissions and commissions of Hilliard Lyons - even with [the]
diligence and good faith - of the Manager.. . for not requiring that Ms. Stavros and
every registered representative be fully trained and continually educated so as to be
knowledgeable and familiar with sound investment principles, including diversifica-
tion and suitability .... 103
9 O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
98 In re Colucci v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 02-01051, 2004 WL
2093105, at *8, *11 (Sept. 7, 2004); see also In re Ash v. Sutro & Co, Inc., N.A.S.D. Docket
No. 93-4698, 1996 WL 1353711, at *7-8 (Mar. 6, 1996).
99 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1594.
100 In re Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 88-02868, 1991 WL
202358, at *2 (June 17, 1991). Compare De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Steams & Co., 306 F.3d
1293 (2d Cir. 2002); Investors Equity Life Ins. Co. of Haw. v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc.,
1997 WL 33100645 (D. Haw.).
101 Peterzell, 1991 WL 202358, at *2. The panel awarded as damages approximately 30%
of the investor's loss.
102 In re Crooks v. Hilliard Lyons, N.A.S.D. Docket No. 99-05493, 2000 WL 1930279, at
*2 (Oct. 27, 2000).
103 Id. at *2.
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The claimant was not advised of the risk accompanying placing a large
portion of a small portfolio in a single high-risk stock, and the arbitrator
awarded the claimant damages for the entire loss sustained.' ° 4 In other words,
the arbitrator explicitly found "diligence and good faith" on the part of the
registered representative and her supervisor, implicitly denied either reckless-
ness or scienter, and yet awarded damages for the entire loss simply because
the recommendation was unsuitable.
In In re Friesz v. Prime Charter Ltd., an arbitration panel found the inves-
tor to have a "philosophy of sophisticated and aggressive investing" and dis-
closed objectives including "short-term trading."' 5 He was actively involved
in trading and acknowledged receipt of a letter from the Director of Compli-
ance disclosing "significant transaction activity."'1 6 The panel found no churn-
ing and no unauthorized trading, but it did find the broker liable for unsuitable
recommendations.' °7 There is a "universal rule of conduct that an investment
advisor must have reasonable grounds for believing that an investment recom-
mendation is suitable for his customer,"1 8 and here the broker was:
unable to articulate any sound analytical basis for soliciting and recommending as
suitable such a large concentration of one position in Claimant's account. His
research was limited to conversations with Metromedia's public relations personnel,
street workers installing fiber network cables underground, and the occasional opti-
mistic "buy" recommendation from an analyst .... The Panel concludes that a
concentration of this magnitude was unsuitable for Claimant's' account. 10 9
Arbitration panels have found that even with an institutional investor there
are instances when aggressive margin bond trading "per se would not be suita-
ble."'o Others, such as In re Poole, have imposed liability for unsuitable rec-
ommendations of three mutual funds emphasizing that the broker "is a
professional with specialized education, training, and experience that gives her
power in relation to an inexperienced person like Claimant."' | As a profes-
sional entrusted with another's assets, the broker "had a duty to do no harm and
to act in [the] the Claimant's best interest. The advice given should have fit the
claimant's characteristics and life situation."' 1 2 In other words, arbitration
panels have imposed liability for the unsuitable recommendation of three rela-
tively conservative investments based on the shingle theory, a general fiduciary
duty owed by a professional broker to an investor.
104 Id. at *3.
1o5 In re Friesz v. Prime Charter Ltd., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 02-02443, 2004 WL 1125843,
at *3 (May 7, 2004).
106 Id. at *4.
107 Id. at *5-7.
108 Id. at *6.
'09 Id. at *6-7. The panel apportioned responsibility for claimant's loss 60% against the
broker and 40% against claimant. Id. at*7. See also In re Meehan v. Schroder Wertheim &
Co., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 96-00167, 1997 WL 460222 (July 7, 1997) (awarding damages
for unsuitable recommendations that excessively concentrated the claimant's account in
three speculative and/or high risk stocks).
110 In re Nat'l Family Care Life Ins. Co. v. Pauli Co., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 96-02673, 1998
WL 1178736, at *25 (July 23, 1998).
"'1 In re Poole v. PFS Invs., Inc., N.A.S.D. Docket No. 04-03447, 2005 WL 2897945, at *4
(Oct. 10, 2005).
112 Id.
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What one finds are arbitration panels that have invoked the discretion
afforded to them and imposed liability for the plain and simple reason that the
brokers made unsuitable recommendations. While it is impossible to state the
examples above are representative of a majority or minority position, they are
consistent with scholars and practitioners finding that arbitration forums are on
the whole more receptive to investor claims than the courts." 3 "This shift in
forum and in governing standards has eased meaningfully the customer's path
to recovery and consequently has increased the customers leverage to compel
a[ny] significant settlement.""' 4
The end result is that suitability requirements play an undeniably impor-
tant role in broker-investor relations. The numbers make that clear. In 1998,
the NASD warned broker-dealers that 95% of all filings under NASD mem-
ber's errors and omissions insurance policies were the result of unsuitability
claims. 1  Arbitration statistics from 2005 show suitability claims continue to
play a leading role: out of approximately 6000 claims filed, the three most
common "controversies involved in arbitration" were breach of fiduciary duty,
3514 cases; negligence, 2225 cases; and unsuitability, 1926 cases.1 16
If one considers the arbitration awards and statistics, in conjunction with
the SRO and SEC's enforcement actions and the courts' recognition of unsuita-
ble recommendations as fraud under the federal securities law, the end result
and inevitable conclusion is that the suitability doctrine plays a pivotal role in
broker recommended transactions in federally regulated securities markets.
The point here is that for the purposes of comparison, the suitability doctrine, in
its various forms, is an indispensable part of the framework of securities law
that governs disputes between individual investors and securities
professionals.' 17
III. THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE AND COMMODITIES LAW
A. The Suitability Doctrine Under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA)
This leads to the question, what about commodities law? The short
answer is that, while the suitability doctrine has been described as "[o]ne of the
most important doctrines under federal securities laws,""' 8 it does not exist
under federal commodities law. "The courts and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC") are in accord that no cause of action exists
under the Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA") for making an unsuitable rec-
ommendation to a customer.""' 9
113 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1558.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1557 (quoting Zarb Urges Broker Dealers to 'Be on Guard' About Suitability, 30
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 810 (May 29, 1998)).
116 Each case can be coded to contain up to four different claims or "controversy types."
NASD, Arbitration and Mediation - Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=516&ssSourceNodeld=12 (last visited
May 15, 2006).
''1 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1557.
118 Id.
''9 POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[D].
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It did not start out that way. Congress created the CFTC in 1974,120 and
in 1977 the CFTC announced proposed customer protection rules, including a
comprehensive suitability rule covered by the anti-fraud provisions of the
CEA. 12 ' The proposed rule would have required each commodity profes-
sional' 22 obtain from the customer within a reasonable period of time before
the transaction the "essential facts" about the customer's financial condition
and trading objectives and have a "reason to believe that the recommendation
or transaction was suitable for the customer." 123 The suitability determination
itself required two different judgments: (1) a determination that commodity
trading in general was suitable for the customer in view of his trading objec-
tives and financial condition, and, (2) a determination that the particular posi-
tion recommended or the subject of a discretionary trade was suitable. 124
In proposing the rule, the CFTC emphasized that "futures commodity cus-
tomers are often unaware of, or inattentive to, the substantial risk of loss in
commodity [futures] trading."' 125 The CFTC stated that "[s]uitability and dis-
closure are separate concepts" and "disclosure alone does not sufficiently pro-
tect some customers.' '126 In addition to the proposed general suitability
requirement, the CFC specifically sought comment on adding objective suita-
bility standards such as minimum net worth requirements.' 27 Much like the
SEC's "shingle theory," the CFC explained that the proposed rule was predi-
cated on the principle that commodity professionals have a special skill, are
presumed to understand the risks, including price volatility, liquidity, limit trad-
ing, and market requirements, and it should not be permitted to shift to the
customer entirely the burden of assessing the risks of a trade. 1
28
120 CFTC, About the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/
cftcabout.htm?from=home&page+aboutcftcleft (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
121 POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[D]; MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.2.
122 The Commission uses the term "commodity professionals" to refer to all Commission
registrants or "representatives" thereof, including any officer, partner, employee, or agent of
a registrant. Proposed Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed.
Reg. 44,742 (Sept. 6, 1977).
123 Id. at 44,750. See also MARKHAM, supra note 15, at § 10.3. When CFTC proposed its
suitability rule, it did not start tabula rasa. The proposed rule was based on SEC Rule
15b10-3, a suitability rule adopted in 1967 and now repealed, covering over-the-counter
broker-dealers not then required to become members of the NASD. See POSER, supra note
26, § 3.03[A][2]; Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3853 (3d ed.
1991); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1583-84.
124 Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. at 44,750.
125 These risks include the ability to purchase futures contracts on small margins resulting in
a high degree of leverage; market prices subject to large rapid fluctuations resulting in sub-
stantially greater losses than the amount deposited as the original margins; and, daily price
limits locking customers into losing positions. Id. at 44,743.
126 Id. at 44,744. In other words, while "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,"
there are some products that the light just does not penetrate well, and some people who
even with good light don't see well, and the law intercedes in those cases. See Louis D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick A. Stokes
Co. 1932) (1914) (stating "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indus-
trial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light [is] the most
efficient policeman .... ").
127 Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. at 44,744.
128 Id.
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The proposed rules stopped at the starting gate. Industry fiercely opposed
the suitability rule, and the CFTC retreated.1 29 In 1978, the CFTC announced
it would not adopt the proposed suitability rule because it was unable "to for-
mulate meaningful standards of universal application," 30 and enacting a suita-
bility rule would "merely have codified principles that are [already] implicit in
the antifraud provisions" of the CEA and CFTC rules.' Professor Markham
has called this explanation "completely contrived,"' 32 and, on its face, it is. It
also stands in marked contrast to the SEC and the securities industry formula-
tion of the suitability requirements discussed above, requirements that are sepa-
rate and distinct from disclosure requirements.
133
Commodities investors were left with risk disclosure and various prohibi-
tions against deception. The CEA proscribes deception in Section 4b prohibit-
ing any member of a registered entity or agent in connection with any order to
make any contract for any commodity in interstate commerce from attempting
to cheat or defraud, willfully causing to be made any false report, or attempting
to deceive by any means:
(i) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(ii) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or
statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any
false record thereof;
(iii) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means what-
soever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of any
such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect to
such order or contract for such person ....134
The CFTC has supplemented this general anti-fraud provision with specific
rules proscribing fraud in connection with commodity option transactions,
135
129 Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,887 (July 24, 1978);
MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.3.
130 MARKHAM, supra note 15, §10.3.
'"I Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (July 24, 1978).
See also Bieganek v. Wilson, 642 F. Supp. 768, 773 (N.D.Ill. 1986); MARKHtAM, supra note
15, § 10.3. POSER, supra note 26, § 3.03[D].
132 MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.3.
133 See infra Part I.
134 It shall be unlawful ... (i) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such
other person; (ii) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false
report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person
any false record thereof; (iii) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other
person by any means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the dispo-
sition or execution of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency
performed with respect to such order or contract for such person ....
CEA § 4b, Fraud, False Reporting, or Deception Prohibited, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2006). CEA §4o
provides a general anti-fraud covering commodities pool operators. CEA § 4o, Fraud and
Misrepresentation by Commodity Trading Advisors, Commodity Pool Operators, and Asso-
ciated Persons, 7 U.S.C.A § 6o (2006).
"I CFTC Fraud in Connection with Commodity Option Transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 32.9,
(2006) (making it unlawful for any person: "(a) To cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or
defraud any other person; (b) To make or cause to be made any false report or statement...;
[or] (c) To deceive or attempt to deceive any other person by any means whatsoever, in or in
connection with.., any commodity option transaction."). See also CFTC Fraud in Connec-
tion with Commodity Option Transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 33.10 (2006).
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fraud in connection with foreign futures and foreign options transactions, and
fraud in connection with transactions in silver or gold bullion and coins.' 13 6
Risk disclosures, disclosure documents that commodity professionals
describe as "phone book size,"'t 37 set forth basic information that must be pro-
vided to investors prior to opening an account for that investor. CFTC Rule
1.55 requires that all futures commission merchants ("FCMs") 138 or introduc-
ing brokers ("Ifs")139 provide a risk disclosure statement that includes the fol-
lowing language:
Risk Disclosure Statement
The risk of loss in trading commodities futures contracts can be substantial. You
should, therefore, carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in light
of your circumstances and financial resources.
1 40
The statement goes on to describe some of the specific risks, including the
possibility of a total loss of funds invested and margin calls, and requires a
signature acknowledging that the investor has received and understood the risk
disclosure statement.' 4 ' CFTC rules for commodities options and leverage
transactions disclosure contain similar warnings:
BECAUSE OF THE VOLATILE NATURE OF THE COMMODITIES MARKETS,
THE PURCHASE AND GRANTING OF COMMODITY OPTIONS INVOLVE A
HIGH DEGREE OF RISK. COMMODITY OPTION TRANSACTIONS ARE NOT
SUITABLE FOR MANY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. 1
42
136 CFTC Fraudulent Transactions Prohibited, 17 C.F.R. 30.9 (2006); CFTC Fraud in Con-
nection with Certain Transactions in Silver or Gold Bullion or Bulk Coins, or Other Com-
modities, 17 C.F.R. § 31.3 (2006).
137 Ginger Szala, 'Phone Book' Disclosures? Managers May Let Lawyers do the Talking,
FUTURES, Dec. 1, 1989, at 66.
138 The CEA defines a "futures commission merchant" ("FCM") as
[A]n individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that - (A) is engaged in soliciting
or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility; and (B) in or in
connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or prop-
erty (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that
result or may result therefrom.
7 U.S.C. § la(20) (2000). See also CFTC GLOSSARY: A GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE
FUTURES INDUSTRY, http://www.cftc.gov/files/opa/cftcglossary.pdf at 30 (last visited Oct. 5,
2005) [hereinafter CFTC GLOSSARY].
139 The CEA defines an "introducing broker" as
[Any person (except an individual who elects to be and is registered as an associated person of a
futures commission merchant) engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or
sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market or
derivatives transaction execution facility who does not accept any money, securities, or property
(or extend credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result
or may result therefrom.
7 U.S.C. § la(23) (2000). See also CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 138.
40 CFTC Distribution of "Risk Disclosure Statement" by Futures Commission Merchants
and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (b) (2006).
141 Id. at 1.55(a)(1)(ii), (b).
142 CFTC Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Option Transaction Disclosure, 17
C.F.R. § 33.7(b) (2006) (emphasis in original); see also CFTC Leveraged Transactions Dis-
closure, 17 C.F.R. § 31.11 (2006).
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The disclosure states that only persons who understand the disclosure
statement and the risks involved should enter into such transactions. 
14 3
Whether it is the general disclosure statement required by CFTC Rule 1.55
or the more specific disclosures for commodities options and leverage transac-
tions, in each case the risk disclosure on its face explicitly shifts the burden of
making a suitability determination to the customer. The only distinction
between the two is formatting. The disclosure rule puts the investor on notice
that suitability is an issue and then says to the investor: you decide whether the
transactions are suitable for you, and you decide whether you understand
them. 1 4
CFTC commentary, however, suggests that commodity professionals may
be required to do more than simply provide the risk disclosure statement. In
adopting regulations governing domestic exchange-traded commodities
options, the CFTC described the risk disclosure statement as "only one element
of the informational duty" of a futures commission merchant. 145 According to
the CFTC, commodity professionals must learn about the customer in order to
provide sufficient risk disclosure and make "every reasonable effort" to see that
options customers are informed as to the risks:
Thus, the FCM must acquaint itself sufficiently with the personal circumstances of
each option customer to determine what further facts, explanations and disclosures
are needed in order for that particular option customer to make an informed decision
whether to trade options .... 146
The CFTC stated that while this requirement was not a "suitability" rule,
before opening an option account the FCM has a duty to learn the personal
circumstances of an option customer:
The procedures to be followed by the prudent FCM in ascertaining those personal
circumstances may require an FCM to make an inquiry into an option customer's
financial situation as well as an option customer's market sophistication for the pur-
poses of determining to what extent risk disclosure above and beyond the disclosure
statement itself might be advisable.
14 7
In short, when the CFTC adopted its exchange-traded commodities option
regulations and disclosure requirements in 1981, it rejected a suitability rule but
suggested in its discussion of risk disclosure that there is an implicit "know
your customer" requirement in the disclosure regulation. This "know your cus-
tomer" requirement in turn requires an assessment of the investor's finances,
sophistication, an ability to understand the transaction, and an explanation tai-
lored to the customer. In its interpretation of disclosure, the CFFC has imposed
a requirement that the commodity professional make a suitability determination
in order to provide a suitable explanation, without having that suitability deter-
143 17 C.F.R. § 33.7(b) (2006).
'44 Commodities investment advisors state up front that: "A trading plan needs a good
foundation. The place to begin is with a complete review of your financial suitability for
trading by determining your net worth and liquid assets.... You need to consider the nature
and the amount of risk that you are willing to take." Diane Krueger, Developing a Trading
Plan, FUTURES, Nov. 1, 2000, at 70.
145 Regulation of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,500,
54,507 (Nov. 3, 1981).
146 Id.; see also MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.4.
147 Regulation of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg. at 54,507.
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mination determine whether the recommendation can reasonably be made in
the first place."'
B. Suitability, the CFTC, and the Federal Courts
The above CFTC risk disclosure and anti-fraud provisions form the basis
for the CFTC's enforcement actions and for CFTC resolution of claims brought
by investors. 149 The CFTC differs from the SEC in that it offers investors the
option of petitioning the CFTC for an award of damages arising from an
alleged violation of the CEA or associated regulations.' 5 ° In its "reparations
program" investors can file a complaint with the CFTC, and have an adminis-
trative law judge ("ALJ") hold a hearing and issue a decision containing find-
ings of fact and conclusion of law.151 Both enforcement actions and reparations
decisions show a similar progression.
Early on, the CFrC brought enforcement actions against commodities
options boiler rooms, and the courts showed every indication of interpreting the
anti-fraud provisions of the CEA broadly. "Just as the federal securities laws
are intended to do, the 1974 Commodities Act amendments are meant to "sub-
stitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the [commodities] indus-
try.' 152 CFTC Rule 32.9, the rule regarding fraud in connection with commod-
ities options, is "as broad as, if not broader than, Rule lOb-5," and the rule
"should be read so as to affect the purposes of the Act and the policies of the
Commission... [C]ases decided under the anti-fraud provisions of the securi-
48 According to Professor Markham, this interpretation "is, in effect, a 'modified' form of
suitability designed to assure proper disclosure. But, it does not impose an obligation on a
broker to make a subjective determination that an investment is appropriate for a particular
customer." MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.4.
149 See Complaints Against Registered Persons, 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2000); CFTC Complaint;
Election of Procedure, 17 C.F.R. § 12.13 (2006). "When Congress revised the Commodity
Exchange Act in 1974, it created the reparation procedure to handle customer complaints
arising from violations of the Act and the Commission's rules by registrants and resulting in
monetary damage to the customer." Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., CFTC Docket
No. 77-46, 1981 WL 26050, at *2 (Nov. 13, 1981). Congress "sought to encourage inexpen-
sive and expeditious adjudication of customer complaints ... [t]he reparation procedure was
intended to be a new remedy for aggrieved customers in addition to litigation in the courts
and arbitration." Myron v. Hauser, 673 F.2d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 1982).
15o 7 U.S.C. § 18 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). The Commission may order an award of "actual
damages proximately caused by such violation." as well as "punitive or exemplary damages
equal to no more than two times the amount of such actual damages" if the action arises
from any "willful and intentional violation in the execution of an order on the floor of a
registered entity..." The action must be brought "within two years after the cause of action
accrues." Id. at § 18(a)(1)(A), (B).
"I1 Dispute Settlement Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 166.5 (2006); Complaint; the Election of
Procedure, 17 C.F.R. § 12.13 (2006). See also CFTC, Questions and Answers about Filing
a Reparations Claim, available at http://www.cftc.gov/proc/pcdrepqna.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2007).
152 Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 358 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) and explaining that "selling techniques that are aimed to
snow the unsophisticated customer 'into parting with funds, often borrowed, which they
could ill afford to invest even in far safer enterprises,' have no place in a regulated industry."
(quoting SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976))).
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ties acts are instructive." '153 These decisions went on to impose injunctions
summarily against commodity professionals who recommended, inter alia,
commodities options "without regard to the suitability of the investment for the
customers" or "without regard to the suitability to the needs of the cus-
tomer." '54 CFTC administrative opinions similarly imposed sanctions and civil
monetary penalties based in part on commodity professionals soliciting "as
many prospective investors as possible without regard to the suitability of com-
modity options as an investment for prospective investors." '55
Early reparations decisions held open the possibility of a suitability
requirement. One decision found the claimant was a "college student with no
income, extremely naive... and from any ethical standpoint totally unsuited to
leverage transactions." 15 6 Another decision found the claimant stated a cause
of action based solely on lack of suitability and the respondents "breached their
fiduciary duty by ... urging complainant to purchase a dealer option at which
time the respondents knew the complainant's physical and mental
condition." ' 5 7
Other administrative law judges, however, sought to avoid the issue, not-
ing in one instance that the claimant was an immigrant with limited English
skills, a house painter by trade, with the salary of $12,000 and no understanding
of futures markets, but that the "customer's suitability need not be addressed"
because of the respondent's misrepresentations about "imminent profits."' 5 8
Others simply found the transaction suitable' 5 9 or rejected outright the imposi-
tion of any suitability requirements."
Two decisions brought the issue to a head. In Hannay v. First Commodity
Corporation of Boston, an administrative law judge found that the complainant
153 Fraud in Connection with Commodity Option Transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (2006);
CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd, 434 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"I Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. at 918; Kelley, 442 F. Supp. at
350. See also MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.4.
"I In re London Commodity House, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 77-4, 1977 WL 13535, at *2.
Compare In re Anthony Luizzi, CFTC Docket No. 78-53, 1981 WL 26079 (Administrative
complaint rejected by the CFTC seeking to revoke the registration of a floor broker based,
inter alia, on recommendations to engage in commodity futures trading "knowing that such
trading was unsuitable").
156 Edwards v. Premex, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 83-RI5, 1984 WL 47592, at *4. See also
McVitty v. Int'l Trading Group Ltd., CFTC Docket No. 83-R427, 1985 WL 54960, at *3.
157 McVitty v. Int'l Trading Group Ltd., CFTC Docket No. 83-R427, 1985 WL 54960, at
*3. See also Yi v. Int'l Trading Group, Ltd., CF.T.C. Docket No. 85-R281, 1986 WL
65625, at *6; Haugland v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., CFTC Docket No. 83-R245, 1986
WL 65886. See also Markham, supra note 15, § 10.5.
158 Gorodettski v. Ace Am., Inc., CFTC Docket No. 82-R174, 1984 WL 47842, at *3. See
also Benzce v. Futures Northwest, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 82-R237, 1985 WL 55184, at *3.
"I Leplely v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., CFTC Docket No. R 80-1302-81-211, 1985 WL
54963, at *4; Burton v. Thompson McKinnon Sec., Inc. CFTC Docket No. R 82-1329-82-
401, 1985 WL 55066, at *5.
160 In re Luizzi, 1981 WL 26079, at *2 (holding that "[n]either the Commission nor the
courts have accepted a suitability standard within the anti-fraud scope of the Commodity
Exchange Act. Significantly the Commission proposed but declined to adopt a suitability
rule. The lack of objective standards of suitability and the corresponding risk of liability that
the adoption of such an unclear and evanescent standard would present prevents us from
finding that Luizzi violated the Act by accepting Mrs. Dwyer as a customer.").
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was made aware of the risks and was "on notice that he could lose his entire
investment and more," and that the respondent "made a conscientious effort to
trade this account in the best interests of his customer." '' In other words,
there was risk disclosure and no attempt to defraud the customer. The ALJ
went on, however, to ask "more fundamental questions":
Was it right, or was it legal, for respondents to solicit a 71 year old novice to invest
90 percent of his liquid assets in a commodity venture and charge this elderly cus-
tomer 60% of his out-of-pocket investment in commissions? Was it right, or was it
legal, for respondents to encourage, or fail to discourage, this elderly customer from
exposing himself to enormous risk[?] .. . I think not.1
62
The ALJ found respondent's recommendations unsuitable, a reckless
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the customer, and a violation of Section 4b
of the CEA.
163
In Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., the ALJ similarly rejected
all of complainant's claims, save suitability.64 The ALJ reviewed the CFTC's
proposed suitability rule, the CFTC's earlier decisions, and its definition of
fiduciary and concluded that "suitability is implicit in the antifraud provisions
of the Act, and has not been abrogated."' 65 The ALJ found Phacelli, a fifty-
seven-year-old disabled carpenter with a low fixed income, disability, and lim-
ited savings, unsuitable for commodities trading and entitled to
compensation. 166
The CFTC took issue with both opinions in Phacelli v. ContiCommodity
Services, Inc. 167 On appeal, it held:
The Commission's adjudicatory opinions have consistently declined to read into Sec-
tion 4b of the Act, a requirement that commodity professionals determine a cus-
tomer's suitability to trade futures contracts .... The courts have also recognized
that no suitability requirement presently governs commodities futures trading ....
Based on commission precedent and the great weight of authority in the courts, we
hold that a commodity professional does not violate Section 4b merely because he
fails to determine whether a customer is suitable for commodity trading.'
68
According to Phacelli, the CEA is not "indifferent" to the individual char-
acteristics of the customer.' 69  Some courts have found "overreaching"
equivalent to fraud, and, in analyzing reliance in fraud cases, courts have "long
recognized" that "people who are exceptionally gullible, superstitious, ignorant,
stupid, dim-witted, or illiterate have been, allowed to recover when the defen-
dant knew it, and deliberately took advantage of it."' 7 ° In Phacelli, however,
161 CFTC Docket No. 83-R589, 1984 WL 47943, at *3.
162 Id. at *4. See also Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., CFTC Docket No. 80-385-
80-704, 1984 WL 47924.
163 Phacelli, 1984 WL 47924, at *17-18.
164 Id. at *11.
165 Id. at *12-17.
166 Id. at *17.
167 Id. at *1.
168 Id. at *5-8.
169 Id. at *8.
170 Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 751
(5th ed. 1984)).
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there was no evidence of "overreaching" and no affirmative misrepresentation
or omission giving rise to an analysis of the investor's reliance. 7'
The CFTC found that the initial Phacelli decision rested solely on the
suitability of the recommendations, reversed, and dismissed the complaint. 7 '
It found the initial Hannay decision "may have intended to" award reparations
based in part on a traditional fraud analysis and remanded for further proceed-
ings.173 With Phacelli, the CFTC explicitly rejected a suitability requirement
under the CEA and offered, in its stead, recognition that some transactions may
be unconscionable and, in fraud cases, that the reasonableness of the investor's
reliance may depend on her characteristics as an investor.' 7 4
With Phacelli, the lines were drawn. Some ALJ decisions now routinely
and summarily reject any claim smacking of suitability.1 75 Others now expan-
sively interpret disclosure requirements and work very hard to "find a misrepre-
sentation where they think the customer is unsuitable."'
176
Immediately after Phacelli, the basis for liability in Hannay switched
from suitability to material misrepresentations of the profitability of trading and
the degree of risk. 177 In Edwards v. Balfour Maclaine Futures, Inc., an ALJ,
"conceding that this Commission has no suitability rule," nonetheless found
"that respondent's acceptance of this septuagenarian as a customer suggests
that these respondents have a callous, contemptuous view of the law and the
disregard for the welfare of senior citizens with limited income and
resources.''178 The ALJ went on to hold that:
Disclosure of material facts is more than merely passing out forms to potential cus-
tomers. Little more would be required in dealing with a sophisticated, experienced
and relatively affluent person. However, in soliciting elderly, unsophisticated, and
less affluent persons, as in the instant case, greater disclosure must be made. 179
In other words, the ALJ held, as the CFTC suggested in its comments on
commodities options disclosure, that legally adequate disclosure requires con-
sideration of the suitability characteristics of the customer and a tailored duty to
explain.
171 Id. at *8-9.
172 Phacelli, 1986 WL 68447. at *9.
173 Id.
174 Id. See also PETER A. ALCES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 3:11 (2006) (cit-
ing U.C.C. § 2-302 and stating that it "provides that a court may adjust the term of the sales
contract after the fact if there has been unconscionable overreaching by one of the parties" to
a sales contract and that the courts have identified two types of unconscionability, procedural
and substantive, and for the former considered factors including "age, education, intelli-
gence, business acumen and experience of the parties; the relative bargaining power; the
consciousness of the contract language; ... the oppressiveness of the terms; and the presence
or absence of meaningful choice").
175 MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.7.
176 Id.
17 Hannay v. First Commodity Corp., CFTC Docket No. 83-R589, 1987 WL 106945.
178 CF.T.C. Docket No. 93-ROO5, 1993 WL 193896, at *1, rev'd, 1994 WL 267438 (finding
claims time barred).
179 Id. at *3.
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The CFTC affirmed a similar analysis in Nobrega v. Futures Trading
Group, Inc. 180 In Nobrega, the ALJ found the complainant was permanently
disabled, being treated for depression and anxiety, and had begun investing in
futures "to provide for his disabled daughter with major medical and education
needs, while on a relatively limited disability income himself." '' The ALJ
found that the claimant had informed his broker that he was counting on him in
order to purchase a wheelchair lift for his disabled daughter, 82 and the broker
had breached his duty by merely repeating that profits were not guaranteed.' 83
The ALJ acknowledged at the outset that the CEA has "been definitively
interpreted as not including a general duty to inquire into a customer's suitabil-
ity to trade futures," but found the act was not indifferent to the individual
characteristics of the customer.' 84 Nobrega was ignorant of the risks of trading
and the issue was "simply whether Weisser, intentionally or recklessly, disre-
garded information that should have alerted him to Nobrega's unrealistic profit
expectations and lack of true appreciation of risk." '85 The ALJ found,
"[s]imply put, a broker has a the duty to correct a customer's erroneous beliefs
about trading risks or expected profits when, as here, the broker becomes aware
of those beliefs. Where, as here, reminders of previous warnings do not correct
the customer's delusions, the broker is responsible for taking additional
action." 186
On appeal the CFTC reversed, but it did so without rejecting the AL's
legal analysis imposing a duty to correct a customer's erroneous beliefs. The
CFTC found that Nobrega was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he
would have relied on the information that should have been disclosed: "that
options trading is too inherently risky to be a source of funds to pay for a
medically-related need." '8 7 In other words, the CFTC accepted the ALJ's
focus on Nobrega's unsuitability for trading commodities options and imposed
a duty to correct Nobrega's misunderstanding of the risk. The CFTC stated
unequivocally that commodity professionals must inform investors in like cir-
cumstances that "options trading is too inherently risky" to pay medical bills.
At the same time, other reparations decisions focus on suitability charac-
teristics not to justify enhanced disclosure requirements, but as part of a scien-
ter and reliance inquiry in the context of a misrepresentation analysis. The
focus on the claimant's suitability, or lack of suitability, however, remains the
same.
In Modlin v. Cane, the complainant began trading after listening to an
infomercial on CNBC and calling an advertised number. 188 The ALJ found the
180 Nobrega v. Futures Trading Group, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 98-R161, 1999 WL 450858,
at *2; Nobrega v. Futures Trading Group, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 98-R161, 2000 WL
1460081, at *8-10.
181 Nobrega, 1999 WL 450858, at *2.
182 Id. at *1-3.
183 Id. at *11-12.
184 Id. at *9-10.
185 Id. at *10.
186 Id. at *11.
187 Nobrega, 2000 WL 1460081, at *11 (finding that the damages were not proximately
caused by the broker's failure to inform Nobrega of the risk).
188 CFTC Docket No. 97-R083, 1998 WL 429622, at *1-3.
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respondent fraudulently induced "an unsophisticated investor" to open and con-
tinue to trade two commodities futures accounts; 189 the ALJ went on to
examine whether Modlin justifiably relied on the broker:
Modlin has a high-school education and had never traded commodities before his
dealings with Cane. Modlin clearly expressed to Cane his lack of knowledge about
commodities and indicated that he intended to rely entirely on his broker if he opened
an account. Cane took advantage of Modlin's naivete and ignorance .... Under
these circumstances, Modlin's reliance on Cane's reassurances and misrepresenta-
tions is clearly justifiable. 190
The CFTC affirmed the ALJ award emphasizing that the reliance was jus-
tifiable: the investor was unsophisticated and had a limited understanding of
futures trading.'9 The respondent, in turn, had fostered a relationship of trust
and confidence and knew that the investor had no futures experience, limited
investment experience, and could not evaluate the solicitation. 9 ' The CFTC
focuses here on claimant's suitability characteristics in making a determination
as to the investor's reasonable reliance and the respondent's scienter.
This indirect focus on suitability comes up repeatedly. 19 3 In Sanchez v.
Crown, the complainant was a sixty-seven-year-old, semi-retired laborer with a
high school education and an income under $10,000, who purchased unleaded
gas commodity options after watching another infomercial. 194 The ALJ found
the respondent intentionally defrauded Mr. Sanchez by "providing a heavily
lopsided picture of the relative risks and rewards of following ITG's trading
advice and by pushing the purchase of deep-out-of-the-money options in order
to generate excessive commission income."' 9 5 The ALJ rejected the respon-
dent's justification for the transactions because the transactions "cannot be jus-
189 Id. at *6-7.
190 Id. at *14.
191 Id. at *8-9.
192 Id.
193 See also Bruggeman v. Broadstreet Fin. Corp., CFTC Docket No. 01-R105, 2004 WL
433690, at *8 ("The intentional nature of Fisher's fraud is underscored by Fisher's knowl-
edge that Bruggeman was an inexperienced and unsophisticated novice of modest financial
means who relied on him to provide fair and reasonable trading advice, Fisher's knowledge
that Bruggeman was investing retirement funds and thus understandably concerned about
losses, and Fisher's knowledge that Bruggeman believed Siegel's false message that FSG
only recommended safe trades .... ); Tymniak v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., CFTC Docket
No. 88-R36, 1989 WL 242101, at *1 (finding all complainants were immigrants, with "noted
English language difficulty;" one was seventy-seven years of age and retired with an annual
income of $9,000; one worked as a salesman with an annual income of $8,000 to $19,500;
and one was employed as a production worker earning $14,000 annually; none with any
training or education in finance or investments, none with any prior experience in futures or
options transactions).
194 Sanchez v. Crown, CFTC Docket No. 02-R50, 2003 WL 21196530, at *1, 7, 20.
195 Id. at *20; see also New York Mercantile Exchange Rule 300.10(B), available at http://
www.nymex.com/rule-main.aspx?pg=38#300.10 (last visited May 29, 2007) (defining a
deep-out-of-the-money options as "an option whose strike price is more than X strike prices
distant from the strike price closest to the price of the price of the underlying futures con-
tract, when X equals two(2) plus the number of calendar months remaining to option expira-
tion .... '$
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tified for Sanchez whose trading objective included, at a minimum, a
reasonable chance of profit with a reduced risk tolerance." 196
The CFTC affirmed the award, noting that Sanchez had disclosed that he
was poorly educated, had held menial jobs, was unemployed, and had little
investment experience.' 97 The CFTC noted that the respondent emphasized
profits, rushed him through the account opening, and failed to provide the full
required risk disclosure statement, but again it emphasized:
Sanchez had not traded futures or options before and his investment experience was
limited to buying and selling his residence and investing in a bank-sponsored mutual
fund. He had little formal education and had not worked in jobs that exposed him to
financial instruments and their risk. Accordingly, he had nothing in his own back-
ground to draw on to evaluate the risk .... Therefore, we find that Sanchez relied on
the nondisclosure in opening his account. 198
In both the ALJ and CFTC opinions, liability is premised on non-disclo-
sure and misrepresentation about risk, but both recite facts focused on suitabil-
ity. The ALJ noted Mr. Sanchez's lack of education, lack of assets, and lack of
understanding and rejected the respondent's arguments given Mr. Sanchez's
"trading objective" and "reduced risk tolerance." 199 The CFTC found that Mr.
Sanchez had little investment experience, little education, and an inability to
evaluate the risk, and, as a result, his reliance on the broker's nondisclosure of
the risk was reasonable. 2" The CFTC is now highlighting traditional suitabil-
ity factors in finding fraud based on a failure to disclose.
Not all decisions involve such clearly unsuitable investors, but a surprising
number do involve suitability determinations. Since the Phacelli decision,
respondents have continued to argue and decisions have continued to find that
the claimant "was suitable" for the trades recommended, and, as a result, there
were no violations of the Act or regulations. 20 1 ALJs have engaged in what
one Commissioner has termed a "reverse suitability" analysis: despite the
CFTC's rejection of any implicit suitability requirements under the CEA, they
consider the investor's suitability in rejecting liability. 20 2 Commissioner West
has protested:
I find it inconsistent to apply a suitability standard after the loss to disqualify some
customers from recovery of their losses. Doctors, lawyers, dentists and educated
customers of all sorts may be the victims of fraud. A customer with a college degree
should not be a free ride for those brokers who use fraud to solicit their customers. 20 3
196 Sanchez, 2003 WL 21196530, at *22.
197 Sanchez v. Crown, CFTC Docket No. 02-R50, 2006 WL 156743, at *1, *3.
198 Id. at *6.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See Anderson v. Roose, CFTC Docket No. 94-R130, 1995 WL 392692; Ricci v. Com-
monwealth Fin. Group, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 95-R043, 1996 WL 729367; Shin v.
PaineWebber Jackson and Curtis, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 85-R 118, 1986 WL 66100, at *2;
Redwood Trust, Inc. v. R.J. O'Brian and Assoc., CFTC Docket No. 00-R040, 2000 WL
1072506, at *2.
202 Steen v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., CFTC Docket No. 84-R339, 1992 WL 41433, at *12
(Comm'r West, concurring).
203 Id. . See also In re Keith Gordon, CFTC Docket No. 90-19, 1993 WL 80512, at *4
(quoting ALJ opinion that although the suitability of the customers is not a consideration
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The end result is that while the CFTC retreated from its proposed suitabil-
ity rule in 1977, and definitively rejected in Phacelli its earlier suggestion that a
suitability requirement is implicit in the CEA, suitability issues remain and a
suitability determination made by the CFTC is commonplace. It happens, how-
ever, under the rubric of disclosure: it takes the form of enhanced disclosure
requirements so that commodity professionals are required to provide unsuita-
ble investors additional risk disclosure, explain the risks, and, in some cases,
tell customers futures transactions are "too risky" for them. It also happens
under the rubric of a fraud analysis that focuses on the elements of scienter and
reliance: the more unsuitable the investor, the clearer the evidence of scienter
on the part of the commodity professional presenting a lopsided picture of the
risks and then reasonable reliance by the investor. Finally, it happens when
ALJs reject claims based on the investor's sophistication.
The federal courts have not provided the same level of analysis, but almost
uniformly and most summarily, they adopt the position of the CFTC holding
that the anti-fraud provisions within the CEA do not impose a suitability
requirement. 204 As discussed above, in reviewing early CFTC enforcement
actions, some courts upheld sanctions based, in part, on the commodity profes-
sionals' disregard of the unsuitability of the recommendations. In doing so,
they suggested that CFTC anti-fraud provisions are "as broad as, if not broader
than, Rule lOb-5," and "cases decided under the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities acts are instructive. ' 205 Later decisions, however, have specifically
disavowed any suggestion that suitability requirements recognized under the
Securities Exchange Act offer any support for the imposition of a similar
requirement under this CEA.2 6 They have relied on what one court has
described as a false syllogism: the CFTC considered adopting a suitability rule;
it did not adopt such a rule; therefore, the CFTC rejected the notion that the
CEA embraces the suitability doctrine - and that settles the matter.2 °7
A federal district court in Bieganek v. Wilson offered more than this syllo-
gism, noting that while the CFTC declined to adopt a general suitability rule in
1978, it did not reject application of the suitability doctrine finding it already
implicit in the CEA.20 8 Biegnak did not, however, differ in result. It found that
the CFTC had retreated from its stance in 1978 and the legislative history did
not "specifically" support recovery on a suitability theory: "Lacking any gui-
dance from Congress, and clear signals from an administrative agency with
expertise in the area, we decline to be the first court to hold that the CEA
implicitly imposes a suitability rule on brokers. ' 2° Other courts have followed
here, "somewhat in mitigation... the customer witnesses at least had reasonable educations
and some of investment background.").
204 MARKHAM, supra note 15, at § 10.8.
205 CFrC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y
1977).
206 See, e.g., J.E Hoetger & Co. v. Asencio, 558 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
207 Bieganek v. Wilson, 642 F. Supp. 768, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 774.
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suit and simply "determined that there is no suitability rule under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act." 21
0
The end result is that under the CFTC's purview, ALJs couch suitability
issues in terms of enhanced disclosure requirements and a misrepresentation
analysis. The CFTC acknowledges that disclosure can require admonitions to
the investor that commodities trading is "too risky," but there is no suitability
requirement. The federal courts have simply followed suit.2 1'
C. Suitability and the National Futures Association
The National Futures Association (NFA) is a self-regulatory organization,
authorized as a "registered futures association" pursuant to the CEA.2 12 It is
the counterpart to the NASD, overseeing the 4200 firms and 55,000 associates
in the futures industry.2 13
In 1985, while Phacelli was pending, the CFTC wrote the NFA inquiring
of "any efforts NFA may be pursuing with respect to professional conduct stan-
dards, including but not limited to practices commonly referred to as suitability
or 'know-your-customer rules'. '214  The CFTC followed this in 1986, in
Phacelli, finding that "[e]ven if a suitability requirement could be grounded in
some other provision of the Act ... we believe that the fashioning of a worka-
ble requirement and creation of the guidelines that would determine its scope
and practical impact on commodity professionals and customers would be bet-
ter done on an industry-wide generic basis than through the reparations
process. 215
That year, the NFA adopted NFA Rule 2-30: Customer Information and
Risk Disclosure.21 6 The rule added for the first time a "know your customer"
210 Kearney v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 701 F. Supp. 416, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
Dyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 928 F.2d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1991);
Wasnick v. Refco, Inc., 911 F.2d 345, 348 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); Trustman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1985 WL 28, at *15 (C.D.Cal.) (unpublished opinion); Emami
v. CFTC, 1989 WL 99250, at *2 n. 10 (9th Cir.) (unpublished opinion).
211 State courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen &
Hertz, Inc., 587 So. 2d 273, 279 (Miss. 1991) ( "[A] commodities broker in a non-discretion-
ary account only owes his customer the duty to properly execute trades as directed by him,
and has no further duty to call upon his own professional skill and prudence as to the wis-
dom of any of his customer's trades."); Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1981) ("A broker whose client maintains a nondiscretionary account has no common
law duty to ascertain the suitability of a customer to make investments.").
212 National Futures Association, About NFA, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org./
aboutnfa/indexAbout.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). The CFTC designated the NFA as a
"registered futures association" in 1981 for the purpose of providing self-regulatory func-
tions in the public interest. Howard Schneider & Hon. Mary L. Schapiro, Regulation of
Commodities Futures and Options Trading, 662 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE
LAW AND PRACTICE 497, 540 (1989).
213 Id.
214 Letter from John A. Webb, Secretary of CFTC, to Joseph H. Harrison Jr., General Coun-
sel and Secretary NFA (Feb. 1, 1985), quoted in MARKHAM, supra note 15, §10.9.
215 Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., CFTC Docket No. R80-385-80-704, 1986 WL
68447, at *9.
216 NFA, Rule 2-30, Customer Information and Risk Disclosure, available at http://www.
nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualCompliance.asp#2-30 (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
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requirement.217 Pursuant to this rule, each Member "shall exercise due dili-
gence" to "obtain information about its futures customers who are individuals
and provide such customers with disclosures of the risks of futures trading."' 8
The information to be obtained includes: (1) the customer's name, address, and
principal occupation or business; (2) estimated annual income and net worth;
(3) approximate age; and (4) an indication of previous investment futures trad-
ing experience.21 9
This requirement, in and of itself, is hardly remarkable. The rule, how-
ever, establishes a separate set of requirements for transactions involving secur-
ities futures products and is accompanied by two interpretive notices, both of
which are remarkable.
A June 1, 1986 interpretive notice makes clear that while NFA Rule 2-30
is a "know your customer rule," it is not like the NYSE know your customer
rule: "it does not require the Member or Associate to make a final determina-
tion that a customer should be barred from futures trading on suitability
grounds. '220 The interpretive notice, as much as anything, sets out the NFA's
argument for why a suitability rule is not appropriate for the futures markets:
"The futures industry differs from the securities industry. ' ' 2 2 1 While different
types of securities have varying degrees of risk and serve different investment
objectives, futures contracts in general are highly volatile and it "makes little
sense to presume that a certain futures trade may be appropriate for a customer
while others are not. An appreciation of the risks of futures trading must be
gained and a determination of its appropriateness made at the time each cus-
tomer makes a decision to trade futures in the first place. 222 Based on these
two observations, the NFA concludes:
The futures industry has traditionally met this need through risk disclosure designed
to encourage the customer to make an informed decision as to whether futures trad-
ing is suitable for that customer. The Risk Disclosure Statement and the Options
217 NFA's Interpretative Notice, NFA Compliance Rule 2-30: Customer Information and
Risk Disclosure (June 1, 1986), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manual
interp.asp#4.
218 NFA, Rule 2-30, Customer Information and Risk Disclosure, supra note 218.
In addition, Members that are not also members of NASD Regulation, Inc. and their Associates
must obtain the following information from each customer who is an individual if the customer
trades securities futures products: (5) whether the customer's account is for speculative or hedg-
ing purposes; (6) the customer's employment status (e.g., name of employer, self-employed,
retired); (7) the customer's estimated liquid net worth (cash, securities, other); the customer's
marital status and number of dependents; 9) such other information used or considered to be
reasonable by such Member or Associate in making recommendations to the customer.
Id.
219 Id.
220 NFA's Interpretive Notice (June 1, 1986), supra note 219.
Rule 2-30 is a 'know your customer' rule; however, it does not require the Member or Associate
to make the final determination that a customer should be barred from futures trading on suita-
bility grounds. Some "know your customer" rules in the securities industry (New York Stock
Exchange Rule 405, for example) have been construed in that manner; these interpretations do
not applied to Rule 2-30.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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Disclosure Statement mandated by CFTC Regulations ... each are designed to bring
the suitability issued to the customer's attention.
223
In its interpretive notice, the NFA offers tradition as the rationale for dis-
missing an independent suitability requirement, and it adds reliance on the
CFTC. As discussed above, when the CFTC declined to adopt its proposed
"suitability" rule, it stated that it was unable "to formulate meaningful stan-
dards of universal application. 2 24  While Professor Markham found this
excuse contrived, the NFA found it persuasive:
NFA found the same difficulty, and for that reason the Rule is premised on NFA's
conclusion that the customer is in the best position to determine the suitability of
futures trading if the customer receives an understandable disclosure of risks from a
futures professional who "knows the customer.
225
What the NFA offers is tailored risk disclosure. According to the NFA,
the CFTC risk disclosure documents provide the minimum required:
[T]the decision with respect to what additional disclosure, if any, should be given to
the customer is best left to the Member .... There may be some customers for
whom the additional disclosure will portray futures trading as too risky for that cus-
tomer... [Wiho those customers are cannot be made except on a case-by-case basis,
because no objective criteria can be established that will apply to all customers. 226
In June, 1999, Daniel Roth, then vice president and now president of the
National Futures Association, testified before Congress and concluded that
despite the NFA's explicit rejection of a suitability rule, the NFA's "know your
customer" rule and a suitability rule are functionally equivalent. According to
Mr. Roth, because futures and options contracts all involve substantial risk,
"[t]he more appropriate focus in the futures industry is on whether the customer
should be trading futures at all. ' 227 As part of this inquiry,
NFA's rule requires the Member firm obtain the same type of information about the
customer that suitability rules require. If the customer has no business trading in
these markets, the firm has to tell him exactly that. In short, the differences between
suitability rules and our Know Your Customer Rule are not significant and the basic
type of protection afforded by each is the same.
228
The second, July 1, 2000, interpretive notice reiterates that the NFA's
"know your customer rule" may require a member provide additional risk dis-
closure including informing a prospective customer that futures are too risky:
The heart of Rule 2-30 is the requirement that Members obtain certain basic informa-
tion from the customer concerning his financial background, analyze that information
and ensure that the customer has received adequate risk disclosure .... [S]ome
customers may require risk disclosure in addition to that specifically prescribed...
223 Id.
224 CFTC, 43 Fed Reg. 31,886, 31,888 (1977-1979 Transfer Binder) Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20, 642.
225 Id.
226 NFA's Interpretive Notice (June 1, 1986), supra note 219.
227 Testimony of Daniel J. Roth, Vice President and General Counsel National Futures
Association, Before the Subcommittee on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops
of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture (June 8, 1999), available at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsTestimony.asp?ArticleID=281.
228 Id.
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[T]here may be instances where, for some customers, the only adequate risk disclo-
sure is that futures trading is too risky for that customer.
2 29
Where an associated person ("AP") 23° solicits a couple without prior
investment experience who informed the AP that they could not afford the min-
imum investment, additional risk disclosure is required.23' Where an AP solic-
its a seventy-seven-year-old who stated that he and his wife were in ill health
and one of his reasons for investing in futures was his desire to earn money to
pay for his medical expenses, additional risk disclosure is required. 32
The catch with NFA Rule 2-30 is that, according to the NFA, the need for
additional risk disclosures does not result in additional liability. From the out-
set, the NFA sought explicitly to foreclose civil liability arising from its newly
enacted "known your customer" rule.
NFA's enactment of the Rule 2-30 should not be construed to expose Members to
increased potential liability for damages in customer litigation or reparation proceed-
ings. [It is a] business conduct standard [that does not] create a private right of action
.... [It] is not an anti-fraud rule ... to the extent that personal information about a
customer is germane to the issues in a reparations or arbitration case, it is undoubt-
edly already beingen considered even in the absence of a formal rule requiring Mem-
bers to obtain it.
233
The July 1, 2000 interpretive notice describes the two objectives of the
rule as defining "high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade" and providing "a useful tool to combat any unscrupulous
firms attempting to take advantage of unsophisticated investors. 23 4 The intent
was, in response to CFTC inquiries, to provide an enforcement tool against
those who take advantage of unsophisticated investors, but not a civil remedy.
To conclude that the NFA rejected suitability, argued to Congress that its
"know your customer rule" was the functional equivalent of a suitability rule,
tried to preclude additional civil liability, and that's that, however, is
premature.
In December 2000, Congress enacted the Commodities Futures Moderni-
zation Act ("CFMA"). The CFMA amended the Commodities Exchange Act
to, inter alia, clarify the Act's application to off-exchange trading in foreign
currency futures and options. Thereafter, the NFA adopted Requirements for
Foreign Currency Futures or Options Transactions and followed with an Inter-
229 NFA's Interpretive Notice, NFA Compliance Rule 2-30: Customer Information and to
Risk Disclosure (Staff, Nov. 30, 1990; revised July 1, 2000), available at http://www.nfa.
futures.org/nfaManual/manuallnterp.asp#1 3.
230 The CFTC GLOSSARY defines "Associated Person" (AP) as "[a]n individual who solicits
or accepts (other than in a clerical capacity) orders, discretionary accounts, or participation
in a commodity pool, or supervises any individual so engaged, on behalf of a Futures Com-
mission Merchant, an Introducing Broker, a Commodity Trading Advisor, a Commodity
Pool Operator, or an Agricultural Trade Option Merchant." CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note
138.
231 NFA's Interpretive Notice (Staff, Nov. 30, 1990; revised July 1, 2000), supra note 231.
232 Id.
233 NFA, Rule 2-30 Interpretive Notice (June 1, 1986), supra note 219.
234 NFA Rule 2-30 Interpretive Notice, Customer Information and to Risk Disclosure (Staff,
Nov. 30, 1990; revised July 1, 2000), supra note 231.
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pretive Notice titled "Forex Transactions with Forex Dealer Members. '23 5 The
Rule and Interpretive Notice apply only to retail customers and are intended to
"provide adequate protection for retail customers without imposing undue bur-
dens on NFA Members. 2 36 The Interpretive Notice again focuses on the NFA
"know your customer" rule:
Members and Associates have a duty to acquaint themselves sufficiently with the
personal and financial circumstances of each [retail] forex customer to determine
what further facts, explanations and disclosures are needed in order for the customer
to make an informed decision on whether to enter into forex transactions.
237
The Regulatory Guide provides examples:
[I]f a customer does not have experience trading forex, you must determine what
additional information the customer needs to make an informed decision on whether
to enter into forex transactions. In some circumstances (e.g., if the customer is living
on social security or is looking for a safe investment), you may even have to tell the
customer that forex trading is too risky for that particular customer.
238
Again, NFA members have a duty to know their customers and in some
circumstances a duty, framed as a disclosure requirement and not a suitability
requirement, to tell their customers that "forex trading is too risky."
The 2000 CFMA also authorized securities futures products, futures con-
tracts on single securities, and certain indices.2 39 Unlike other futures, how-
ever, the CFMA provides that securities futures products are both securities and
futures, regulated by both the CFTC and SEC.240  As a result, the "NFA
235 NFA Rule 2-36. Requirements for Foreign Currency Futures or Options Transactions
(effective June 28, 2002, amended Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa
Manual/manualCompliance.asp#2-36; NFA Interpretive Notice, Forex Transactions with
Forex Dealer Members (as revised June 13, 2005), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfaManual/manuallnterp.asp#53 (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). See also NFA, RETAIL FoREx
TRANSACTIONS: A REGULATORY GUIDE 5 (2007), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
compliance/publications/forexRegGuide.pdf.
236 NFA Interpretive Notice, Forex Transactions (as revised June 13, 2005), available at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManua/manuallnterp.asp#53.
237 Id.
At a minimum, the Member soliciting the [retail] customer to engage in forex transactions with a
Forex Dealer Member should obtain the customer's name, address, principal occupation or busi-
ness, current estimated annual income and net worth, approximate age, and an indication of the
customer's previous investment and trading experience. Members and their Associates need to
ensure that each [retail] customer they solicit has received adequate information concerning the
risks of forex transactions so that the customer can make an informed decision as to whether
forex transactions are appropriate for the customer.
Id.
23s NFA, RETAIL FOREX TRANSACTIONS: A REGULATORY GUIDE, supra note 237, at 5.
239 NFA, SECURITIES FUTURES PRODUCTS: A REGULATORY GUIDE (2004), available at http:/
/www.nfa.futures.org/compliance/publications/sfp/sfp-web.pdf. Indices regulated both as
futures and securities are "narrow-based indices" such as an index allowing an investor to
trade on a specific market sector. It does not include "broad-based indices" such as the Dow
Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq, NYSE Composite, or the S & P 500, which trade on
futures exchanges and are regulated only by the CFTC. Id. at 1-2. Narrow-based securities
indices are defined further in 7 U.S.C. § la(25) (2000).
240 NFA, SECURITIES FUTURES PRODUCTS: A REGULATORY GUIDE, supra note 241, at 1. A
securities futures product is defined by the Commodities Exchange Act as "a security future
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security future." 7 U.S.C. § la(32)
(2000). A "security future" is defined as "a contract of sale for future delivery of a single
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became a national securities association for the limited purpose of regulating
... members ... registered as brokers or dealers in securities futures. '241 The
NFA, which had made clear that Rule 2-30 was not a "suitability" rule, added a
"suitability" rule for securities futures products. 24 2 It revised Rule 2-30 to
expressly incorporate suitability requirements modeled after the NASD suita-
bility rule for options discussed above.24 3
If the customer trades securities futures products, NFA members must
"exercise due diligence" to learn additional "essential facts," including the cus-
tomer's investment objectives, employment status, estimated liquid net worth,
marital status, and number of dependents, and such other information consid-
ered reasonable in making recommendations to the customer. 244 For non-dis-
cretionary accounts, no commodity professionals shall recommend to a non-
institutional customer securities futures products "without making reasonable
efforts to obtain current information regarding the customer's financial status
and investment objectives. '"245
No commodity professional shall recommend securities futures products
"without reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation or strategy
is not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of the customer's current invest-
ment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other information
known .... ,,246 Finally, no commodity professional shall recommend a securi-
ties futures transaction unless the person making the recommendation has a
reasonable basis for believing that the customer has such knowledge and expe-
rience in financial matters that the customer may reasonably be expected to be
capable of evaluating the risks of the recommended transaction and is finan-
cially able to bear the risks of the recommended transaction.2 47
According to NFA Rule 2-30, members must approve or disapprove the
customer's account for securities futures transactions in writing and forward the
background and financial information upon which the customer's account has
been approved to each customer, unless the information has been obtained in
writing from the customer.2 4 8
The end result is that commodity professionals now are subject to a suita-
bility rule when they recommend securities futures products, much like the one
found in the securities industry regulating options transactions. Commodity
professionals now are subject to, maintain records for, and ensure compliance
security or of a narrow-based security index, including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof," excepting certain securities exempted under Section 3 (a)(12) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and certain contracts or transactions excluded under the Com-
modities Exchange Act and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act. Id. § 1a(31).
241 NFA, SECURITIES FUTURES PRODUCTS: A REGULATORY GUIDE, supra note 241, at 1.
242 Id. at 7, 8.
243 Id. at 8; Testimony of Daniel J. Roth, supra note 229.
244 NFA, SECURITIES FUTURES PRODUCTS: A REGULATORY GUIDE, supra note 241, at 7;
NFA Rule 2-30 Customer Information and Risk Disclosure, supra note 218, at (c).
245 NFA Rule 2-30 Customer Information and Risk Disclosure, supra note 218, at 2-
300)(3).
246 Id. at 2-300)(4).
247 Id. at 2-300)(5); see also NFA, SECURITIES FUTURES PRODUCTS: A REGULATORY
GUIDE, supra note 241, at 8.
248 NFA Rule 2-30 Customer Information and Risk Disclosure, supra note 218, at 2-
300)(4)-(5).
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with two different sets of standards, depending on which futures product is
recommended.
D. Arbitration and the National Futures Association
The National Futures Association, like other SROs also maintains an arbi-
tration forum for resolution of futures-related disputes, and NFA Arbitration,
like NASD Arbitration, is now the primary forum for dispute resolution." 9
According to the Procedural Guide for NFA Arbitrators, the NFA provides an
award form and "[t]he award is to state the result and should not include rea-
sons for the decision." '25 The instructions precluding arbitrators from provid-
ing reasoned awards obviously limits their review.
The NFA Arbitration Manual does, however, discuss suitability, stating
that neither the CEA nor the CFTC impose suitability requirements and the
NFA has adopted a "know your customer" rule instead of a suitability rule.25 '
The rule clearly recognizes, however, that the information obtained from
some customers will show that they need a greater explanation of the risks
involved in futures trading and that for some customers the only adequate risk
disclosure is to tell them that futures trading is too risky for them. Once that
has been done, each customer is free to make the decision whether to trade
futures or commodities options.25 2
Like other NFA pronouncements, the NFA Arbitrators Manual states that
there is no suitability rule, but there are cases where commodity professionals
must advise their customers that futures trading is too risky for them, i.e. that it
is unsuitable for them. Like other NFA pronouncements, the manual recog-
nizes that there are times when investors simply are not suited to trading in
futures and that a commodities professional should inform the customer of that
fact, but it does not impose liability based on a commodity professional's rec-
ommendation of an unsuitable futures transaction.
IV. A MORE SUITABLE RULE
The first, and most obvious, conclusion to be drawn from an examination
of the suitability doctrine under U.S. securities law and U.S. commodities law
is that the CFTC may decline to adopt a suitability rule, decree that suitability
is implicit in the CEA, then decree suitability is not implicit in the CEA, and
the courts may accept that, but suitability problems will not go away. Com-
modity professionals have continued to argue that the futures transactions in
249 The NFA has argued that the CFTC reparation program has "outlived its usefulness."
According to the NFA, in 2002, the CFTC processed 80 cases while 136 cases were filed
with the NFA's arbitration program. Testimony of Daniel J. Roth, President and Chief
Executive Officer National Futures Association, Before the Subcommittee on General Farm
Commodities and Risk Management of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Agriculture (June 19, 2003), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsTestimony
.asp?ArticlelD=1 115.
250 NFA Procedural Guide for Arbitrators, The Award Form, available at http://www.nfa.
futures.org/dispute/ProGuideArb_09After2.pdf (last visited May 29, 2007).
251 NFA, Legal and Procedural Issues for NFA Arbitrators, Suitability 3 (1998), available
at http://www.nfa.futures.org/dispute/legPro.asp.
252 Id.
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question were suitable for sophisticated, affluent claimants. Claimants who are
not sophisticated, affluent investors have continued to emphasize their age, lack
of education, means, and understanding of the transactions that were recom-
mended. The CFTC and NFA have continued to struggle with what to do when
the investor was clearly not suited for futures transactions.
At the CFTC's urging, the response of the NFA has been to promulgate a
"know your customer" rule, reject any suggestion of a suitability requirement,
and argue before Congress that the basic types of protection afforded by each
are the same.253 This raises the question, are they? Is the NFA "know your
customer" rule the functional equivalent of a suitability rule, or a different
animal all together?
An examination of the rules and interpretations suggests that the NFA's
"know your customer" rule functions differently from a suitability rule. The
fact that the NFA rule simply requires a commodity professional to obtain
information from the customer prior to initiating trading, while a traditional
suitability rule requires a broker to have a reasonable basis for believing that
that the recommendation the broker is about to make is suitable for the cus-
tomer, does not, in and of itself, preclude the NFA rule from offering the same
basic type of protection. After all, the NYSE has a structurally similar rule, and
this rule has been interpreted as protecting investors from being induced to
purchase unsuitable securities.25 4
As discussed above, however, the NFA explicitly rejected any parallel
analogy to the NYSE rule and, instead, suggested in interpretive notices, mem-
ber guidelines, and its arbitration manual that the rule may require additional
disclosure.2 5 5 "There may be some customers for whom the additional disclo-
sure will portray futures trading as too risky for that customer. "256 The CFTC
in its interpretation of "the informational duty" of a commodity professional
selling commodities options said the same thing: "the FCM must acquaint
itself sufficiently with the personal circumstances of each option customer to
determine what further facts, explanations and disclosures are needed in order
for that particular option customer to make an informed decision. 2 57 Adminis-
trative law judges after Phacelli have said the same thing: little more than
passing out disclosure forms may be required with some investors, but "in
soliciting elderly, unsophisticated, and less affluent persons ... greater disclo-
sure must be made." 258
In each case, what the NFA and CFTC are suggesting, through their inter-
pretation of the NFA rule and CFTC disclosure requirements, is that the com-
modity professional make a suitability determination not to determine whether
or not a recommendation can be made, but to determine the amount of explana-
tion required.
253 See Testimony of Daniel J. Roth, supra note 227.
254 MARKHAM, supra note 15, § 10.1.
255 See supra Part III.C.
256 NFA's Interpretive Notice, supra note 217.
257 CFTC, Regulation of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg.
54,500, 54,507 (Nov. 3, 1981).
258 Edwards v. Balfour Maclaine Futures Inc., C.T.F.C. Docket No. 93-ROO5, 1993 WL
193896, at *3 (June 8, 1993).
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In each case, this NFA and CFTC requirement, even if strictly applied,
results in a different transaction chronology. Under a suitability rule, the bro-
ker is required to obtain customer information and, based on that information,
determine whether or not to make a recommendation. Under the NFA rule, the
commodity professional can make the recommendation, close the sale, and then
with a new investor obtain information about the investor and thereafter, if
necessary, suggest that futures trading is "too risky for that customer." The
disclosure comes after the infomercial, after the hard sell, after the investor is
convinced that that the transaction will win. Under the current rule, a commod-
ity professional can solicit an entirely unsuitable customer, recommend an
entirely unsuitable product, and then think about disclosure.
A second difference arises when one looks beyond the initial transaction.
The NFA has argued that because securities brokers have a range of products to
recommend with varying degrees of risk, a suitability rule may be appropriate.
In contrast, because futures and options contracts all involve substantial risk,
"there is little or no basis for assuming that a trade in soy bean futures contracts
would be appropriate for a particular customer but that a heating oil contract
would not. The more appropriate focus in the futures industry is on whether
the customer should be trading at all." 25 9
The NFA rule focuses on the account rather than the transaction. With
this focus, the rule requires an initial explanation of the risks, but it does not
require, for either regulatory or civil liability purposes, that the commodity pro-
fessional have a reasonable basis for each recommended transaction. In con-
trast, the NASD suitability rules are directed to the transaction: no member
"shall recommend to any customer any transaction" without reasonable
grounds to believe the transaction is not unsuitable.26 ° The result is that the
object, and thus the scope, of the NFA's "know your customer" rule and the
securities industry's suitability rules are different.
Their interpretation by the courts, respective regulatory bodies, and arbi-
tration panels also show they are applied differently. There are areas of over-
lap. When the federal courts examine the suitability of recommendations for
securities transactions and find that an unsuitable recommendation may consti-
tute fraud under a "misstatement or omission theory," they are suggesting that
there was a misrepresentation regarding suitability or risk or that there was a
failure to disclose adequately the lack of suitability or risk.26 ' The unsuitable
recommendation is fraudulent because of the misrepresentation or omission.
The CFTC, in its administrative hearings, conducts a similar analysis. It
avoids the word "suitability," but it ties the investor's lack of suitability with
the level of disclosure required and finds fraud in a misrepresentation as to risk
or an omission of material facts relating to the risk that ultimately made the
transaction unsuitable. 62 In other words, there are times when the commodity
professional should have disclosed the transaction was "too risky," but did not,
and this omission constitutes fraud. The CFT7C reaches the same place through
259 Testimony of Daniel J. Roth, supra note 227.
260 NASD Rule 2860(19), supra note 39; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
261 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
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an analysis that sidesteps independent consideration of the suitability of the
recommendation.
As set out above, the suitability doctrine under federal securities law is
not, however, coterminous with the "misrepresentation or omission theory" rec-
ognized by the courts. The courts have also recognized that, under certain cir-
cumstances, the making of an unsuitable recommendation by itself constitutes
fraudulent conduct.2 63 The courts have recognized under the "fraudulent con-
duct theory" that where the broker exercises control, de facto or otherwise, over
the investor's account and recklessly recommends an unsuitable transaction,
there is fraud.
The courts and the CFIC, in rejecting a suitability requirement as implicit
in the CEA, have rejected the possibility that the making of an unsuitable rec-
ommendation, by itself, constitutes fraudulent conduct. In doing so, it cuts off
half the equation. The two theories, "misrepresentation or omission theory" as
opposed to the "fraudulent conduct theory," have a distinct focus and cover
different conduct. A commodity professional may, by an objective standard,
fully disclose the risk and yet fail to gain the understanding of the investor.
Under these circumstances, the broker's de facto or legal control over the
investor's account and reckless disregard of the unsuitable nature of the recom-
mendation is dispositive. Under these circumstances, the focus is on the bro-
ker's conduct rather than the disclosure received by the investor.
The courts and CFTC's rejection of the suitability doctrine under com-
modities law is not simply a rejection of the "fraudulent conduct theory" of
liability under federal securities law. If one turns to the SEC and SRO enforce-
ment actions, one sees that the rejection of the suitability doctrine also elimi-
nates all those actions that focus on the broker's conduct and the unsuitable
recommendation itself, regardless of whether the broker exercised control over
the investor's account. Where the SEC says flat out that a "salesperson's rec-
ommendations must be suitable for the client in light of the client's investment
objectives""26 and whether the customers consider the purchase of the stock
suitable "is not the test for determining the propriety of the applicant's con-
duct," '2 65 the CFTC and the NFA state the opposite in their mandated risk dis-
closures. "You [the customer] should .. .carefully consider whether such
trading is suitable." '26 6 It gives no indication that suitability is anything other
than the responsibility of the customer.2 67
If one turns to arbitration, again, one sees that the CFTC and NFA rejec-
tion of the suitability doctrine eliminates actions that focus on the recommenda-
tion. Decisions such as In re Peterzell, which explicitly recognized that
suitability is an ongoing obligation, have no place if one looks only at whether
263 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
264 In re Alacan, S.E.C. Release No. 34-49970, 83 S.E.C. Docket 723, 2004 WL 1496843,
at *9 (July 6, 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
265 In re Chase, S.E.C. Release No. 34-47476, 79 S.E.C. Docket 2251, 2003 WL 917974, at
*4 (Mar. 10, 2003); In re Philips & Co., S.E.C. Release No. 5294, 37 S.E.C. 66, 1956 WL
54332, at *3 (Apr. 9, 1956). See supra notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text.
266 CFTC, Rule 1.55 Risk Disclosure Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 1.55(b) (2006); see supra note
140 and accompanying text.
267 See supra Part III (discussing disclosure requirements).
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an investor has any basis for trading in the futures market in the first place.
Similarly, decisions such as In re Crooks and In re Friesz, which did not find
scienter, did not find misrepresentations, did not find churning or unauthorized
trading, but did find the broker lacked "any sound analytical basis" for "recom-
mending as suitable such a large concentration of one position in Claimant's
account," are eliminated.26 8 The ongoing duties owed by a broker to the inves-
tor under the shingle theory type of reasoning found in In re Poole are elimi-
nated.2 69 Even if these arbitration decisions do not represent a majority
position, they are the visible tip of an iceberg that gives substance to suitability
rules that require plain and simple that brokers have a reasonable basis for
believing their recommendation is suitable for the investor.
If one accepts that the "know your customer" rule in the futures markets
and its interpretation requiring commodity professionals offer a tailored expla-
nation of the risk of commodities trading is not the functional equivalent of the
suitability rules found in the securities industry, the next question is whether
there is a need for a suitability rule and recognition of suitability requirements
under the CEA. An examination of the same rules, interpretations, enforce-
ment, and civil actions suggest that the answer is yes.
There is a question of equity. While investors are now precluded from
claiming damages resulting from the commodity professionals' unsuitable rec-
ommendations, ALJs have continued to apply suitability criteria after the loss
to disqualify customers from recovery. This "reverse suitability" analysis vio-
lates basic notions of fairness: "What's sauce for a goose is sauce for a gan-
der."' 7° If suitability arguments seeking to deny liability are accepted, fairness
demands consideration of suitability claims seeking to impose liability.
At the same time, one must ask whether there is a cost to denying the
existence of a suitability requirement and analyzing suitability issues as evi-
dence of scienter and reasonable reliance, but not analyzing suitability issues as
suitability issues.
In Baker v. Yarusso, the claimant was a former steelworker, an unmarried
father with two dependent children, in debt, unemployed, and brain-dam-
aged. 27 1 He saw an infomercial, called a toll free number and was encouraged
to trade futures.27 2 In analyzing Mr. Baker's claim, the ALJ noted the
respondent' s
blatant disregard of Baker's desire to limit his investment, by Yarusso's recommen-
dation that Baker begin trading before he had any money, by Yarusso's recommenda-
tion that Baker buy too many options, and by Yarusso's knowledge of Baker's patent
lack of sophistication, inability to understand the basic matters such as the mechanics
of trading options, and dire financial condition.
2 7 3
268 In re Friesz, N.A.S.D. Docket No. 02-02443, 2004 WL 1125843, at *7 (May, 7 2004);
In re Crooks v. Hilliard Lyons, N.A.S.D. Docket No. 99-05493, 2000 WL 1930279, at *2-3
(Oct. 27, 2000). See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
269 In re Poole, N.A.S.D. Docket No. 04-03447, 2005 WL 2897945, at *4 (Oct. 11, 2005).
270 McAdams v. Dorothy Edwards Realtors, Inc., 591 N.E.2d 612, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting JONATHAN Swiwr, PoLrrE CONVERSATION (1738)).
271 CFTC No. 98-R160, 1999 WL 538729, at *1 (July 23, 1999).
272 Id. at *2. He bounced his first check trying to open an account. Id. at *4.
273 NASD, Rule 2310, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?
rbid=1189&record id=1159000499 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). See also NASD, IM-
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The ALJ analyzed the claimant's investment objectives, inability to under-
stand the transactions and limited financial means, finding that the broker knew
these facts and acted with scienter in misrepresenting the risk and failing to
disclose the commissions.2 74 Baker was compensated for his losses.2 7 5 Is not
the more basic question, however, what was the broker doing soliciting Baker
to trade futures options in the first place? Is not the problem the fact that the
broker solicited an unemployed, brain damaged, former steelworker to trade
commodities futures, rather than the broker's failure to disclose the cormis-
sions charged and give a balanced presentation of the potential profits and
risks?2 76 Is there a problem with obscuring the issue, so long as the injured
party is compensated, or does everything come out in the wash?
Even when the result is equitable, if the legal reasoning is flawed the pro-
cess suffers. Legal reasoning that obscures the issues but reaches the desired
result, obscures other issues: the CFTC and NFA rejected a suitability rule
because they were unable "to formulate meaningful standards of universal
application" and instead adopted "an additional disclosure" standard that must
be made on a "case-by-case basis. 21 77 In other words, they summarily rejected
a proposed reasonable basis requirement because they were unable to formulate
universal standards, in favor of a disclosure standard dependant on the individ-
ual characteristics of the investor.
The NFA and some scholars have offered an explanation that all futures
contracts are risky as an additional rationale for rejecting a suitability require-
ment: that all futures contracts are risky.278 There is "no basis for assuming
that a trade in soybean futures contracts would be appropriate for a particular
2310(1), Possible Application of SEC Rules 15g-1 through 15g-9, available at http://nasd.
complinet.com/ (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2300. Transactions with Cus-
tomers" hyperlink; then follow "IM-2310-1." hyperlink).(last visited Mar. .3, 2007); NASD,
IM 2310-2, Fair Dealing with Customers, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/ (follow
"2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2300. Transactions with Customers" hyperlink; then
follow "IM-2310-2. Fair Dealing with Customers" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007);
NASD, IM 2310-3, Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, available at http://
nasd.complinet.com/ (follow "2000-3000" hyperlink; then follow "2300. Transactions with
Customers" hyperlink; then follow "IM-2310-3." hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
These Interpretive Materials are accorded the same weight as the rule itself. Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 27, at 1559.
274 Id. at *2-*4.
275 Id. at *5.
276 The CFTC cases discussed above present the same question. In Sanchez v. Crown, the
CFTC premised liability on inadequate risk disclosure, including the respondents' failure to
fax the entire risk disclosure document to Mr. Sanchez. CFTC No. 02-R50, 2003 WL
21196530, at *8, *22 (May 16, 2003). Isn't the basic problem, however, that respondents
solicited the purchase of $32,000 of out-of-the-money unleaded gas options from a 67 year
old with $40,000 in assets, a high school education, and no understanding of commodities
options? See generally supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
277 NFA's Interpretive Notice, supra note 219.
278 "Commodities futures, unlike securities, cannot ordinarily be purchased for conservative
goals, such as income or long-term growth. They are inherently speculative .... Thus, it
may be argued that a suitability rule is not only unnecessary but may also be misused by
investors as a way of recouping fair market losses." POSER, supra note 26, at § 3.03[D].
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customer but that a heating oil contract would not."' 2 7 9 In doing so, they reject
the obvious: that a broker may have a reasonable basis for believing that an
investor is suited to trading in futures markets and still have no basis for recom-
mending a specific trade. The CFTC, futures exchanges, and brokerage in their
rules all recognize that not all futures contracts are alike. It is not simply a
matter of saying if you are suitable for soybeans, you are suitable for heating
oil. Deep-out-of-the-money option contracts, for example, carry far higher
commission and inherently greater risk.28' The CFTC has also acknowledged,
as far back as 1977, the simple fact that the risk of loss depends on the size of
the trade. "Thus, in recommending to a customer the purchase of 10 futures
contracts of a particular commodity the professional would be required to have
a reasonable basis for believing that the risk of loss from an adverse price
movement could be absorbed by the customer without undue hardship. If the
professional thought the risk of buying 10 contracts was too great, the proper
recommendation might be to purchase fewer contracts."'2 81 The CFTC pro-
posed, as a result, two separate suitability determinations: one determining
suitability for trading futures in general, and one determining the suitability of
the particular position recommended.28 2 In short, not all futures transactions
are the same, and any argument that they are provides scant support for con-
cluding that there is no need for a suitability rule in the futures industry.
Even if it were true that all futures contracts are the same because they are
all inherently risky, this is an argument for, rather than against, the imposition
of a suitability rule. The NASD, NYSE, and other SROs all examined options
and warrant trading, found them especially risky, and imposed expanded suita-
bility requirements on its members. The SROs provide extensive risk disclo-
279 Testimony of Daniel J. Roth, supra note 227. "Futures contracts in general are recog-
nized as highly volatile instruments. It therefore makes little sense to presume that a certain
futures trade may be appropriate for a customer while others are not." NFA's Interpretive
Notice, supra note 219; POSER, supra note 26, at § 3.03[D] (see note 280 for pertinent
excerpt).
280 See Sanchez, 2003 WL 21196530 at *21, *6 n.9. An "out of the money" option is one
"which has no intrinsic value. For calls, an option whose exercise price is above the market
price of the underlying future. For puts, an option whose exercise price is below the futures
price." NYMEX GLOSSARY, http://www.nymex.com (follow "Glossary" hyperlink) (last vis-
ited Mar. 3, 2007). A "deep-out-of-the-money option" is defined as "an option whose strike
price is more than X strike prices distant from the strike price closest to the price of the
underlying futures contract, where X equals two (2) plus the number of calendar months
remaining to option expiration, provided, however, that the Exchange may impose additional
criteria as appropriate." NYMEX Rule 300.10(B) Sales of Deep-Out-Of-the-Money
Options, available at http://nymex.com/rule-main.aspx?pg=37#300.10 (last visited Mar. 3,
2007). For deep-out-of-the-money option contracts each member commission merchant
"shall, in regard to all sales of deep-out-of-money options, provide the customer with a full
explanation of the nature of such option prior to any transaction." NYMEX Rule 300.10(A)
Sales of Deep-Out-Of-the-Money Options, available at http://nymex.com/rulemain.aspx?
pg=37#300.10 (last visited June 14, 2006). CFTC Rule 33.4(b)(2) imposes separate rules
relating to deep-out-of-the-money options because of "the potential for misleading and
deceptive practices in the sale of such options." CFTC, Regulation of Domestic Exchange-
Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,500, 54,505 (Nov. 3, 1981).
281 CFTC, Proposed Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals for the
Protection of Customers, supra note 122, at 21,929.
282 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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sure designed to encourage the customer to make an informed decision
regarding options transactions, but they also recognize that this risk disclosure
does not preclude or alleviate the necessity of an expanded suitability rule. The
SEC requires broker-dealers to provide standardized risk disclosure documents
prior to completing penny stock transactions in addition to and apart from
expanded suitability rules imposed because penny stocks present special
risks.283 The arguments for why futures markets do not need a suitability rule
are not convincing.
There are also questions of efficiency. Is there an unnecessary cost in
maintaining and enforcing two separate standards? Since the 2000 CFMA
amendments, if a commodity professional recommends a securities futures
products, there is an unambiguous suitability requirement that they have "rea-
sonable grounds for believing that the recommendation or strategy is not
unsuitable" and a "reasonable basis" for believing the customer can evaluate
and financially bear the risks.28 4 At the same time, during the same interaction
with the same customer, if the same commodity professional recommends a
different futures product, the standard changes to "know your customer." In
terms of regulation and compliance there is efficiency to be gained in applying
one common standard, as opposed to a distinct "know your customer" standard
and a separate "suitability" standard depending what futures product is
solicited.
In determining what standard to apply, Professor Markham has proposed
an objective standard:
[Clonfusion could be avoided by simply imposing objective standards that would
make them per se suitable for trading. Such an approach is neither novel nor
unworkable. Almost every major brokerage firm has objective standards for deter-
mining whether a customer is suitable. For example, the firms may impose restric-
tions that exclude customers from commodity futures trading, at all, where they do
not have, for example, a net worth, exclusive of insurance and home, of $100,000 or
an income of $50,000 that is continuing in nature.
All in all, the situation is a confusing one - needlessly so ... if a suitability standard
is now necessary, beyond a concept of disclosure, much of this confusion could be
avoided by simply imposing objective standards that would make them per se suita-
ble for trading. Such an approach is neither novel nor unworkable. Almost every
major brokerage firm has objective standards for determining whether a customer is
suitable. For example, the firms may impose restrictions that exclude customers
from commodity futures trading, at all, where they do not have, for example, a net
worth, exclusive of insurance and home, of $100,000 or an income of $50,000 that is
continuing in nature.
2 85
The North American Securities Administrators Association
("NASAA")2 86 has proposed similar objective guidelines for commodity pool
283 17 C.F.R. § 15g-2 (2006); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
284 NFA Rule 2-30, supra note 218, at (3)-(5); see also supra note 218 and accompanying
text.
285 MARKHAM, supra note 15, at § 10.9; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
286 The NASAA is an organization of sixty-seven securities administrators in the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Canada, and Mexico.
NASAA History, http:/www.nasaa.org/AboutNASAA/NASAAHistory/ (last visited Mar.
3, 2007).
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programs. 28 7 The sponsor "shall propose minimum income and net worth stan-
dards which are reasonable. 2 88 Unless the state administrator determines the
risks dictate otherwise, the participants "shall have: (a) a minimum annual
gross income of $45,000 and a minimum net worth of $45,000; or (b) a mini-
mum net worth of $150,000.
' 289
The NASAA commodity pool guidelines are, however, in addition to and
not in lieu of a traditional suitability determination: the sponsor "shall make
every reasonable effort to determine that the purchase of the program interests
is a suitable and appropriate investment. '290 The sponsor "shall ascertain" the
minimum income and net worth standards are met; in keeping with the partici-
pants' investment objectives, the participant is able to bear the economic risk;
and the participant understands the investment.
29 1
Objective standards do present a problem of "formulating meaningful
standards of universal application." An elderly investor in retirement may meet
a minimum net worth standard, or exceed it many times over, and still be
grossly unsuited for trading in the futures markets. Similarly, there may be
little reason to exclude from the markets a knowledgeable, younger investor
with significant future earnings potential but limited assets. A requirement that
the commodity professional make reasonable efforts to determine that the prod-
uct is suitable in light of the participant's investment objectives, ability to bear
the risk of loss and that she understands the transaction avoids this issue. There
is no bright line rule, but recognition that many areas of the law do not lend
themselves to bright line rules yet require rules all the same.2 92
287 NASAA, Registration of Commodity Pool Programs, NASAA Statements of Policy
(1990), available at http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/Registration ofCommodity-Pool-
Programs.pdf. . A commodity pool is "[a]n investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of
enterprise operated for the purpose of trading commodity futures or option contracts. Typi-
cally thought of as an enterprise engaged in the business of investing the collective or
'pooled' funds of multiple participants in trading commodity futures or options, where par-
ticipants share in profits and losses on a pro rata basis." CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 138.
288 NASAA, Registration of Commodity Pool Programs, supra note 287, at III.A.2.
289 Id. at III.B. (emphasis omitted). These net worth requirements are lower than those
originally proposed. "The major complaint with the guidelines issued for comment last year
was the suitability rule - who could purchase a fund. The proposal was to require an inves-
tor have a minimum annual taxable income of $60,000 plus a net worth of $60,000 or a net
worth of $225,000." Szala, supra note 137, at 66, 68.
290 NASAA, Registration of Commodity Pool Programs, supra note 287, at III.C. 1. (empha-
sis omitted).
291 Id. at III.C.2(a)-(d).
292 Looking only at fraud cases under the CEA, courts have repeatedly rejected "bright-line"
requirements for defining misleading statements before liability is triggered. CFTC v. R.J.
Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1330 (1 lth Cir. 2002). As with securities law, they have
found a statement material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider it important in making an investment." Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d
105, 111 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
(emphasis added)). They have defined puffery as alleged misstatements that are "so obvi-
ously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the
question of their importance." Saxe, 789 F.2d at 111 (emphasis added). The intent to
defraud may be inferred from a "totality of circumstances." In re Soybean Futures Litig.,
892 F. Supp. 1025, 1045 n.20 (N.D.Ill. 1995). Injunctions against commodity professionals
depend upon the likelihood of future violations which, in turn, "depends on the totality of the
Spring 2007]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Setting aside the difficulties of formulating objective suitability standards,
there is an argument for simply unifying the standards now in place so that the
"reasonable basis" suitability standard currently applied to commodity profes-
sionals soliciting securities futures products applies to all futures products.29 3
In doing so, all commodity professionals would be required to have "reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation or strategy is not unsuitable for
the customer," and all commodity professionals would be required to conform
to the same standards currently in place for brokers of options, warrant, and
other high risk transactions in the securities markets.
The real issue is liability. The NFA's first interpretive notice for its
"know your customer" rule made clear that its rule "should not be construed to
expose Members to increased potential liability for damages." '294 The industry
similarly "geared up" to fight the NASAA commodity pool guidelines, arguing
that "higher suitability requirements and compensation stipulations put a severe
strain on all parties in the pool." '2 95 Brokers argued "[tihe industry has to take
this to court, there's nothing to resolve with these jokers." '296
Opposition to suitability rules within the securities industry has been at
times every bit as sharp. The Midwest Stock Exchange (now the Chicago
Stock Exchange) testified before Congress in 1964 that adoption of a suitability
regulation, of all the recommendations, would be "the most harmful to industry
and future liquidity of the marketplace .... To apply any penal provision or
prohibition that cannot be clearly and comprehensively defined would leave an
entire industry open to irresponsible lawsuits and unlimited liability. 29 7 The
securities industry has not, however, collapsed under the weight of suitability
requirements. There are no reasoned arguments being made suggesting suita-
bility rules have harmed the liquidity of the marketplace, 298 and there is always
the risk of irresponsible lawsuits. That risk must be measured against the risk
of irresponsible solicitation of unsuitable futures transactions.
If, as argued, the current "know your customer" rule and disclosure
requirements provide the same customer protection as a suitability rule, the
extent of liability imposed on commodity professionals should not change with
recognition of a suitability requirement. If, as argued here, the current disclo-
sure regime is not coterminous with one that recognizes suitability as separate
and distinct from disclosure, then liability would necessarily be greater, but
also provide necessary deterrence.
circumstances." CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 677 (D.C.N.Y.
1979).
293 NFA Rule 2-30, supra note 218, at (4).
294 NFA's Interpretive Notice, supra note 219.
295 Ginger Szala, Pool Guidelines 'Double-edged Sword', FUTURES, Jan. 1, 1989, at 56.
296 Szala, supra note 137, at 68. "State administrators have been a major thorn in the indus-
try's side for years." Id.
297 1 Investor Protection Hearings Before Subcomm. of House Comm. On Interstate & For-
eign Commerce on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1963) (quoted
in Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at § 9-C-3 n.158).
298 A literature search (suitability s liquidity in the Westlaw jlr [journals and law reviews]
database) shows the debate regarding suitability and liquidity has centered around the inves-
tor's need for liquidity and not the effect of a suitability requirement on the liquidity of the
markets.
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V. CONCLUSION
A former director of the CFTC's division of trading and markets described
the futures markets as "the wild, wild, west, and they don't want the govern-
ment looking over their shoulder. '2 9 9 Professor Markham has described a
"laissez-faire attitude" in the industry, where "futures traders believe they are
the last bastion of free enterprise where no quarter is given or taken."'300 The
question is whether a laissez-faire attitude in the futures markets and an ethic
where no quarter is given or taken is appropriate in transactions between com-
modity professionals and individual investors, or whether commodity profes-
sionals should be held to the same standard as professionals in other financial
markets.301
The CFrC and NFA arguments for distinguishing the securities markets
from the futures markets and why a suitability rule is not necessary in the latter
are problematic. NFA arguments for why its "know your customer" rule offers
the same protection as a suitability rule are problematic, and the fact that com-
modity professionals continue to solicit permanently disabled, uneducated
investors, semi-retired laborers with an income of under $10,000, as well as
retired steelworkers with brain damage, is especially problematic. These are
egregious examples, even a parade of horribles, but they are also part of a
larger picture that shows a history of commodity professionals soliciting unsuit-
able investors that continues today.
The futures markets have boomed, more than doubling in size between
1999 and 2004.302 Its offerings, including financial products and foreign cur-
rency futures, have grown.30 3 Attention paid to futures markets has grown.30 4
The number of individual investors participating in those markets has grown.30 5
The instances of fraud have grown, with over $350 million dollars in losses in
five years in the currency markets alone.3 ' The regulatory structure for the
futures markets has not.
The NFA "know your customer" rule and the NFA and CFTC disclosure
requirements do not replace a suitability standard or satisfy the need for one.
Suitability is the elephant in the room that nobody talks about, but should.
299 Susanne Craig, Regulators Launch Inquiries Into Refco, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at
C3.
" MARKHAM, supra note 15, at § 10.2.
301 Futures trading "hasn't been as heavily regulated as stock trading." The CFTC has
brought fewer cases and levied fewer fines than regulators like the SEC; however, "as this
comer of Wall Street has grown in complexity and size over the years, there have been calls
for greater regulation." Craig, supra note 301, at C3.
302 See supra notes 5-6.
303 See supra notes 7-12.
304 See supra notes 2-4.
305 See supra notes 13-14.
306 See supra note 17.
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